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ABSTRACT
WEI JINGSHENG AND THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT IN POST­
MAO CHINA.
Merle David Kellerhals, Jr.
Old Dominion University, 1998 
Director: Dr Jin Qiu
The hypothesis tested in this thesis was whether there has been an evident 
evolution in the democratic thought of those engaged in China’s Democracy Movement in 
the post-Mao era. Chinese democratic activists today have been greatly influenced by the 
tradition of remonstrance of the ancient minister and poet Qu Yuan, who gave his life out 
of remorse for his king and the loss of the kingdom. Liang Qichao introduced democracy 
to China in 1895, only to have to flee the country or face death for his views. The activists 
of the Democracy Movement of 1978-79, following the tradition, were among those 
substantially influenced by the events of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The 
activists initiated big character posters on Democracy Walls throughout China -  but 
among the most influential was Beijing’s. Though many of the numerous democracy 
activist groups that emerged as the movement gained momentum held differing 
philosophical positions, they held some quite common concerns over democracy, civil 
liberties, employment, and basic economic needs. Wei Jingsheng represented the more 
vocal and extreme democratic position in his wall poster The Fifth Modernization: 
Democracy, which first appeared in late 1978 and which brought to the movement an 
aspect of the liberalism controversy that had not been expressed or defined previously.
Wei, who spoke to the reasons why China must democratize, was not the only voice or 
only perspective to emerge. Fang Lizhi and Yan Jiaqi each took the argument for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
democracy steps further in expressing the means and the outcomes to be achieved. Finally, 
students from major universities in Beijing began six weeks o f demonstrations from mid- 
April to 4 June 1989 touched off by the sudden death of Hu Yaobang, who was the 
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary. The June Fourth Movement involved similar 
aspects of remonstrance that included petitions, banners, and an attempt to speak directly 
to governmental authorities. It ended with the deaths of hundreds or thousands, but it also 
set in motion the culture of reform.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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NOTE ON ROMANIZATION
Pinym is used throughout this thesis without tone or diacritical marks for the 
transcription of Chinese names and terms. This system of romanization, introduced in the 
1950s, is officially approved by the People’s Republic of China. Where the older Wade- 
Giles equivalents are used, it is because they may be better known to the reader or because 
of the use of some references that were published before the current system of 
romanization had been employed, accounting for possible inconsistencies in spelling and 
punctuation. In some instances the older system of romanization has been used because it 
is difficult to recognize in Pinym. Additionally, all Chinese names referenced in this thesis 
follow accepted usage of the family name coming first followed by the two-syllable given 
name without commas and hyphenation.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The ancient minister and poet Qu Yuan (Ch 'u Yuan) committed suicide by 
drowning in the Milo River out of remorse for the death of his king and the loss of the 
great southern Kingdom of Qu in 278 B C E. during the Warring States period. Qu died 
willingly despite his controversial views over how the Kingdom of Qu was governed. He 
had consistently pleaded in protest, or dissent, even while in exile after losing favor at 
court. His life and death represents the complex nature of remonstrance, or the way of 
dissent in Chinese political thought. Qu Yuan held loyalty to his king and state in such 
high regard that he was willing to die out of a sense o f righteousness.1 The mythology of 
Qu Yuan illustrates quite succinctly the plight of those political activists who in 1978 
defied convention and launched the Democracy Movement to bring political liberalization 
and reform to the Chinese government. Following the ancient tradition of Chinese activists 
who practiced remonstrance, Wei Jingsheng -  who became a leading activist in 1978 -  
posted his big character essay The Fifth Modernization: Democracy on Beijing 
Democracy Wall. Wei placed himself in direct conflict with the prevailing regime of Deng 
Xiaoping and established a radical tempo in the ensuing ideological struggle This 
ideological struggle o f the Democracy Movement followed an ancient tradition based on 
the notion that every official -  regardless of the consequences -  was bound to inform the 
imperial court, or government, with honest advice for necessary reforms intended for the
Note: The sty le manual followed in the preparation of this thesis was the sixth edition of Kate L. 
Turabian, A Manual for Writers o f Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations.
'Laurence A. Schneider. .4 Madman o f Ch u: The Chinese Myth o f Loyalty and Dissent 
(Berkeley: University of California Press. 1980). 1-3. 201.
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2betterment of the state. The advice is given in an unselfish manner with complete loyalty.
My thesis examines the evolution of some critical democratic thinkers in the post- 
Mao era to determine the scope and direction o f their political thought and analysis. They 
were selected not necessarily because they were active leaders o f the Democracy 
Movement or because they were the most well known, but because o f the pivotal time of 
their writings in the movement and the critical juncture with government policy making.
All of the activists stressed one critical feature -  reform but not revolution of government 
in the spirit of loyalty and unselfishness. They did not want to tear down China’s political 
institutions, but wanted to see reforms put in place based on existing features such as the 
Chinese Constitution. Wei Jingsheng’s benchmark essay that appeared on Democracy 
Wall that cold night in December 1978 may speak clearer than anyone has about 
democracy in China and its potential realization. Though Wei is among the more 
influential political activists of his time, he is not alone and I would not suggest in this 
thesis that he is the paramount leader of that vibrant Democracy Movement. He did not 
launch the movement, but in fact spent most of the past twenty years in prison for his 
writings, which weakened his immediate and timely influence on the movement’s 
subsequent direction. Others who have been influential include Fang Lizhi, Yan Jiaqi,
Chen Eijin, and the countless editors and writers of numerous study societies, journals, 
and newspapers published by seemingly crude means during the short-lived Democracy 
Movement and the pivotal Tiananmen Square demonstration of 4 June 1989, which 
showed the world in graphic terms the twenty-year democracy struggle inside China.
These years of political activism have produced a body of thought, though highly diverse
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3in perspective, that demonstrates a clear evolution and new intellectual dynamic.
More clearly than any other essay, document, or political journal of that time, Wei 
Jingsheng’s essay defined the democracy sought by modem Chinese political activists. 
Where Confucius (Master K'ung) traveled in pre-imperial China promoting his priorities 
of ritual, humanness, and education, along with the furtherance of a morally just 
government -  in the tradition of remonstrance, Wei’s essay was in response to the new 
government policies of the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. Deng had consolidated 
power and control of the massive Chinese government two years after the death of 
Chairman Mao Zedong and the arrest and incarceration of the Gang of Four. Deng 
Xiaoping had proposed to guide China into modernization through a program called the 
Four Modernization’s -  modernizing agriculture, industry, science and technology, and 
defense. The program has not been as smooth a transition into modem world economics 
as many had envisioned, though the Chinese have made great strides in achieving the goals 
that first surfaced about 1965 in speeches by Deng and Premier Zhou Enlai. Wei argued 
that Deng’s programs would not reach fruition without a fifth modernization -  democracy 
that was based at its most fundamental on the protection of individual civil liberties.2 His 
position was not all that radical given the context within which he made his argument. 
Every Chinese constitution since the Sun Zhongsan (Sun Yat-sen) inspired 1911 
Republican Revolution that ended the Imperial dynastic cycle has recognized the people as 
sovereign, though almost no political leader or government since has been able, or more 
often willing, to define that sovereignty.
‘ James D. Seymour, ed.. The Fifth Modernization: China's Human Rights Movement, 1978-1979 
(Stanfordville. N.Y.: Human Rights Publishing Group. 1980). 1.
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4The Chinese regularly use the terms “democracy,” “citizen,” “constitution,” and 
“sovereignty,” but lack a conceptual framework for their meaning as in Western political 
thought -  creating a dichotomy. Wei Jingsheng and many other voices have expanded the 
concept in much broader terms and taken the evolution of democratic thought to a higher 
dimension, exposing basic political rights, equality, and the power to elect and remove 
officeholders. Chinese democratic thought can only be understood in the historical 
tradition, and the questions and reforms being posed now have little difference from those 
first posed in 1895 by the Literati Liang Qichao, who first introduced the concept of 
Western democracy to the Chinese people. To understand how far China has come since 
1978 when the modem Democracy Movement began requires a somewhat broader 
perspective in understanding how democratic thought has been adapted to Chinese 
political thought. This evolution in thought is an illustrative intellectual history that is a 
dynamic dimension to a post-Confucian society. Though it should be understood that 
actual Imperial Confucianism was in reality an amalgam of Legalism and Confucianism, 
which should be distinguished from the original teachings of Confucius as well as the 
personal Confucian philosophy that emerged in the Song Dynasty. Imperial Confucianism 
was employed by the emperors to contain, control, and manage the state. The despotic 
statecraft of the Qin Dynasty embraced Legalism, and the Han -  which followed -  added 
to that a set of ideas derived from Confucianism to eventually create a total state 
philosophy. The emperors liked Legalism and the bureaucrats liked Confucianism, which 
created an interesting political mix.3 The Imperial Confucianism that emerged as state 
ideology, however, was not classical Confucianism but an interpretation by the Han
3 John King Fairbank. China: A Sew History (Cambridge: Belknap Press. 1992). 62.
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Dynasty scholar Dong Zhongshu ( Tung Chung-shu, 179-104 B C E.) -  whose concept 
was strongly theistic and metaphysical.4
Democracy in the Western context has come to mean rule by or of the people. 
Government obtains authority to govern so long as the people give consent, the 
fundamental application o f the theory of the Social Contract defined by Hobbes, Locke, 
and Rousseau. As a corollary, citizenship has been understood as the inherent right of 
participation, but even more is the expectation o f participation. Democracy has taken on in 
the modem context many principles and practices including popular sovereignty, voting, 
representation, jury duty, equality, and majority rule -  all requiring active citizen 
participation. Finally in the Western context democracy has become highly diverse in its 
various forms as seen in the United States, Canada, Japan, Taiwan, and Europe. 
Democracy as such in China is both socialist and Chinese. The Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) perceives democracy as a socialist democracy which represents the interests of 
workers and peasants in a harmonious relationship of the citizen and the state and public 
interest is placed higher than citizens' rights, but it does not mean absolute power is held 
by the people. Its system features one-party dominance and the state power to make laws 
necessary without judicial review. It is a political system not at all similar to Western- 
based political systems. The authority to rule in the Second Republic does not stem from 
the consent of the governed with one person and one vote at the national level, but rather 
from democratic centralism. In China, problems are derived more from the operations of 
the political system -  which is a one party system in a totalitarian regime rather than the
4David S. Nivison and Arthur F. Wright, eds.. Confucianism in Action (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 1959). 182-84.
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6ideas or perceptions.
Democracy first appeared in China in 1895 through the writings o f the intellectual 
Liang Qichao His writing came during demonstrations in front of the Imperial Censorate 
in Beijing, a site which later became Tiananmen Square, when Chinese intellectuals 
protested the Treaty of Shimonoseki following the disastrous Chinese defeat in the Sino- 
Japanese War of 1894-95 It marked a major shift in the political thought of the Chinese 
people and a complete revolution in traditional political interaction between the people 
and the imperial government.
Never before had the people been allowed to address political issues directly or 
indirectly to the throne Previously the only means for addressing issues to the throne was 
by memorials from high-ranking officials submitted to the emperor through a system of 
official posts within the elaborate bureaucracy of the imperial court in Beijing. The 
emperor would study each document and make comments in the traditional vermilion ink 
reserved for his use. Each decision returned as an edict that had to be recopied, registered 
and eventually sent back to the bureaucracy through the same course of posts by which it 
arrived. High-ranking officials were allowed to address the throne in memorials that 
specifically concerned them. In times when the nation was at severe risk, the emperor 
would “widen the road for speech” and permit lower-ranking officials and some unofficial 
intellectuals to address specific issues through the memorial system. It was in those very 
rare times when the road had been widened that unofficial opinion-makers could hope to 
reach the emperor’s attention.5
5Andrew J. Nathan. Chinese Democracy (New York: Alfred A  Knopf. 1985). ix-x.
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7Change in thought and politics, though, were shifting away from the ancient 
imperial system toward greater liberalism. It has become a pattern that has characterized 
Chinese politics to the present. The imperial totalitarianism established by Qin Shi 
Huangdi, China’s first emperor, began to lessen with the establishment of the First 
Republic in 1911, though it was supplanted with renewed warlordism and authoritarianism 
after the death of Sun Zhongsan. With the arrival of the Second Republic in 1949 and the 
leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, the socialist state imposed a similar authoritarian 
system of government. Deng Xiaoping began expanding political liberalism incrementally 
during his tenure as paramount leader with some subtle but expansive measures that have 
gone almost unnoticed in the West.
Liang Qichao first appeared on the national stage during the Beijing revolt in 1895 
along with his liberal mentor Kang Youwei. They sought reforms from the Qing Court 
that were intended to transform China from a feudal society into more of a democracy 
along the lines of Meiji Japan, Britain, and Germany -  all of whom represented political 
systems based on a constitutional monarchy. Eventually, their efforts produced the 
“hundred days” reform movement, but failed ultimately when the Dowager Empress Ci Xi 
rescinded reforms enacted by the rather weak Emperor Guangxu and resumed direct rule 
of the disintegrating empire. Liang and Kang Youwei were forced to flee China to Japan 
when the Dowager Empress attempted to have them arrested and executed, an interesting 
pattern for political activists that has not changed radically ever since. Although Liang’s 
objective of converting China to a Westem-style democracy never fully materialized, he 
continued to influence political thought from the Qing Dynasty to the Republican period -  
both Nationalist and Communist. Liang’s influence has been made entirely from his
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8extensive writings of more than forty volumes which reflect a blend of traditional 
Confucian orthodoxy and Western political thought. Confucian orthodoxy required a 
natural harmony of social roles. In this scheme, the political energies of the citizens would 
contribute to the collective welfare -  not for the pursuit of personal interests -  but as a 
duty much like those of the bureaucrats appointed to office might perform. Liang’s 
writings, some forty volumes, became a window on all that was modem and foreign and 
might be used to save China. He studied Western political thought through Japanese 
translations of Western works and he visited the United States briefly, touring the country 
for six months before returning to his exile in Yokohama. His visit to the United States 
convinced him that China probably could never develop into the democracy he had seen in 
the West. It may well have been a mistake for him to equate democracy in the United 
States with what China could develop, because almost no other country in the world could 
transform itself into a political system like the United States. The political system in the 
United States is more the exception than the rule in democratization.
Liang preferred economic growth for China to class warfare. Mao, who had read 
both Liang and Kang Youwei while a youth, went to the opposite extreme. Liang’s 
concept of growth, however, was embraced by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping in their 
design of the Four Modernization’s -  which to work would require a massive economic 
development program. In 1979 the Enlightenment Society of Huang Xiang -  one of 
several major Democracy Movement societies to develop between 1978-79 -  paraphrased 
Liang in saying that China must have a stable democratic government to become strong. It 
would take that to be able to mobilize the support and wisdom of every member of the 
country. It was also understood that modernization through democratization was still
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9unrealized.6
The initial Democracy Movement began in October 1978 when activists began 
questioning how a powerful government such as China’s could rule by consent of the 
governed. When Deng’s government emerged in 1978, he began permitting democracy 
activists to place big character posters -  a vestige of the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution -  on democracy walls across the country. The most widely known democracy 
wall in China was Beijing’s on Xidan Street near the intersection of Changan Avenue. The 
legendary wall, often referred to simply as “Xidan Democracy Wall,” is a 200-yard gray 
brick wall surrounding a bus yard a few blocks from Tiananmen Square, near the Great 
Hall of the People, Zhongnanhai, and the Imperial City. By 6 December 1979, authorities 
ceased permitting the posting of unofficial materials on the walls, ending the movement in 
its most unrestrained form. After that Beijing activists continued to place posters on walls 
and signs at several universities and in Yuetan Park, which is in a residential area three 
miles west of the center of the city. In January 1980, Deng essentially ordered no posting 
of wall posters of any type. Deng was following in essence the pattern set by the ancient 
emperors who opened the channels for opinion and then closed them when the voices 
exceeded unspecified limits set by the emperor’s expectations, a pattern deftly practiced by 
Mao who often encouraged others to speak their minds on key issues -  but only within 
limits set by Mao. An example of Mao’s deceptive notions of widening the road came at 
the 1959 Lushan Conference, which was called by the party leadership to discuss the 
conditions of the country following the failure of the Great Leap Forward economic 
program. At that meeting in July 1959, Mao called for open discussion and criticism.
Nathan. Chinese Democracy, 64-65.
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Defense Minister Peng Dehuai rose to explain to Mao the deteriorating condition of life in 
the Chinese countryside, but Mao interpreted it as an assault on his leadership and the ill- 
fated speech by Peng Dehuai ultimately cost him power and position in the government. 
Peng had been with Mao for more than thirty years, since the 1920s and was the military 
marshal who led Chinese troops in the Korean Civil War. Peng’s efforts to speak from the 
heart about the problems of the people were a disaster, and illustrated that Mao did not 
really mean that when he widened the road, and there were limits -  though opaque. For a 
time at least, Deng had allowed the wall posters and expanded public comment, holding 
the view that at times the government needed to be urged by the activists. Though it is 
equally true the wall posters and the fledgling Democracy Movement needed Deng’s 
hidden political agenda as much as he needed their wall posters to help subdue his 
opponents, the dichotomy created a kind of symbiotic relationship between the paramount 
leader and his political remonstrators.7
The Democracy Movement -  like in the time of Confucius, Qu Yuan, and Liang 
Qichao -  grew out of the turmoil, chaos, humiliation, suffering, and desperation created by 
the Cultural Revolution. It was, to be sure, a negative aspect of the movement While the 
activists were in their 20s to 30s, they had vision of political change for China, but not 
dismantling of the government, which is an aspect o f the notion of Chinese democracy that 
Westerners fail to grasp. They wanted freedoms for the individual -  a contrary perspective 
from the traditional orthodoxy but not at the cost of the state. No one advocated 
overthrowing the Chinese government, but they called for greater popular participation 
and control over events within the system -  a distinction between rebellion and
Seymour, The Fifth Modernization. 12-13.
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remonstrance. One of the more negative aspects of the Cultural Revolution was that many 
of China’s youth failed to get the basic and advanced education they needed for being 
productive -  they were simply never given a chance.8 They simply were not able to 
support the programs that Deng Xiaoping had initiated. The communist party had 
effectively alienated the students of the Cultural Revolution and the aging Marxist 
doctrines were failing to keep pace or maintain the interest of the new political activists.9 It 
is certainly true in this instance that the young minds of China wasted on Mao’s obsession 
with class struggle was a horrendous tragedy Wei Jingsheng arrived at his place in the 
movement from the dark side of the Cultural Revolution that literally wrenched him from 
junior high school and from his experiences and service in the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA).
Wei Jingsheng, a son of two party members, was sixteen when he was drawn in to 
the Cultural Revolution, ‘Vhich forced people to abandon the superstitions and prejudices 
that had dominated their minds for so long and made them begin to scrutinize their own 
attitudes and beliefs.” He loved literature, but also developed a strong interest in 
philosophy which led him to read every extensive work by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, 
and Mao. His readings in part were also encouraged by his father, who wanted all his 
children to develop a strong sense of Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought. Until his 
illusions were later shattered, Wei says he became a fanatical Maoist. His mother, though, 
also encouraged her children to soften their political ideology with readings about the lives 
and struggles of everyday Chinese in the People’s Republic and their sacrifices.
“Ibid.. 14.
9Fairbank. 421-22.
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Wei said the Cultural Revolution actually began as an explosion of rage over the 
gap between official policy and reality It was a period of chaos brought about by years of 
communist despotism. However, the explosion of rage took the form of tyrant worship. 
People actually struggled to support despotism, which illustrated the “blindness of the 
mass struggle and the extent to which the people’s minds remained shackled by feudalistic 
ideas.” It was this experience that set Wei on the course he took to join the Democracy 
Movement, not unlike many others who became political activists.10
Wei first saw the futility of Mao’s socialist empire after joining the Red Guards in 
1966, ostensibly because of dissatisfaction with the lack of social equality. Wei postulates 
that the movement failed finally because it began with the ideology of despotism. 
Nevertheless he joined the Cultural Revolution believing that Mao was right and that class 
struggle still existed and needed to be expelled from Chinese society He, like many others, 
believed that class enemies were responsible for all inequality and unhappiness in China. 
After spreading across China and fomenting more class struggle and almost no class 
redemption, Wei said the enthusiasm of the moment wore off as doubts about their 
purpose began to emerge. The Red Guards youth from Beijing who returned to the capital 
after their tours in the countryside began splitting into smaller factions as doubts and 
dissatisfaction with the results of their efforts surfaced. Many of their party heroes and 
mentors had been purged, which left many in the movement completely confused. He and 
friends went in to the Northwest region to find out for themselves what was happening in 
China. What Wei and his friends saw was abject poverty, and that socialism as an
luWei Jingsheng. The Courage to Stand Alone, trans. anded. Kristina M. Torgeson (New York. 
Viking. 1997). 229-31.
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economic system had failed the people in the outlying areas. He was seeing reality for the 
first time without the filters of Maoist ideology, and he saw what Beijing had been saying 
was not possible -  that socialism was not superior to capitalism though it is not clear Wei 
understood completely what a capitalist system was at that time. Later when he was 
fleeing authorities for belonging to a group of former Red Guards that were opposed to 
the Gang of Four, Wei says “I saw for myself how Mao’s theory o f ‘class struggle’ was 
actually played out in real life; and when I went on to do a stint in the army, I saw once 
again how the theory of class struggle had seeped into every comer of life.”11 He was 
finally arrested after a year and spent four months in prison on a relatively minor charge 
After his release he was assigned to the Beijing Zoo as an electrician, which was possible 
because of his family’s cadre status in the CCP That experience changed his life and he 
began studying politics and was able to gain some insight into international affairs through 
reading the Reference News, which was only available to a certain level of party cadre. In 
1969 Wei joined the Chinese Army and was able to travel around the country and see 
conditions for himself. Being able to join the PLA at such a critical time in Chinese internal 
affairs is another indication of the status his family held, something many others simply 
could not do. He was discharged after four years and rejected a chance to become a low- 
ranking official to return to the Beijing Zoo and his former job. He witnessed the 5 April 
1976 demonstrations at Tiananmen Square and became aware that China needed to 
change. By then Wei began spending time at the home of his Tibetan girlfriend in Beijing 
where he began writing essays on democracy. His sharpness o f style and daring in his 
essays won him instant attention in the movement, though he never enjoyed a broad and
" Ibid. 232-33. 248.
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solid base of support within the Democracy Movement .12
Though many of the numerous democracy activist groups that emerged as the 
movement gained momentum held differing philosophical positions, they held some quite 
common concerns over democracy, civil liberties, employment, and basic economic needs. 
Some of the organizations were at best loose coalitions as a result of their diverse 
backgrounds and levels o f education, which created periods when they often did not seem 
to be connected with other elements which weakened them instead of projecting a united 
front. While the initial movement was suppressed in 1979 when the crackdown came, the 
literature and writings have survived to fuel the evolution in political thought. When the 
crackdown did begin the democratic groups fractured even more.13
The movement was related in 1978 to the rapid political and economic changes 
taking place in the country, and became entangled in the power struggle that ensued after 
Mao’s death. When Deng launched his drive to implement the Four Modernization’s, 
which signaled a break with the ideological left and the politics of the Cultural Revolution, 
democratic activists believed a new era had emerged and supported him. Deng reinforced 
his commitment to a new, more liberal reign when he initiated the rehabilitation of China’s 
political outcasts from the previous regime going back as far as 1957 and the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign. These people were generally more liberal and possessed the skills Deng needed 
to push his modernization programs. He also wanted to show the Chinese people that he 
wanted a modem China founded on law with citizen’s rights. It has been speculated that 
Deng also wanted the rehabilitation of political outcasts because he, too, had been one and
1 "Seymour. 16.
I3Ibid. 2. 14. 23.
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had spent considerable time in exile. This included those who had been purged along with 
Deng, but not those purged before the Cultural Revolution or after it 14 It is important to 
understand that Deng Xiaoping was as much a victim of the Cultural Revolution as many 
others, and it helped to shape his own perspectives on the kind of government he would 
lead
Deng’s rehabilitation campaign focused on the cases of approximately 100 million 
Chinese He appointed Hu Yaobang to conduct the campaign. Deng, himself, ordered the 
review of 388 cases involving demonstrators who had been arrested 5 April 1976, the 
traditional Grave-Sweeping Day, in a demonstration to memorialize the death of Premier 
Zhou Enlai in Tiananmen Square. In every case, the Chinese government reversed the 
verdicts and formally announced it on 15 November 1978. Democracy Wall on Xidan 
Street emerged. Ten days later the first modem democracy demonstration was held in 
Tiananmen Square to hold public comment on government and public officials. It was an 
extraordinary break with China’s past political relationship with its people. Remonstrators 
of the fourth century B C E. were from China’s elite classes, while the twentieth century 
counterparts came from every class, including the most politically conscious -  students, 
workers, and party members Interestingly in the remonstrators cases that were later 
rehabilitated, all were judged correct at the time of their rehabilitation. None were 
reported to have criticized Mao, only his close supporters. The CCP had said that these 
people had remonstrated -  not rebelled.15
The 1978 Chinese constitution promoted popular control of government with
14 Ibid.. 7-8.
15 Nathan. Chinese Democracy. 7-10. 26.
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guarantees o f freedom o f speech, correspondence, the press, demonstration, and freedom 
to strike by workers. The constitution also promoted the right of citizens to speak freely, 
air their political views, hold public debates on issues o f the day, and write big-character 
posters for all to read. The Democracy Movement spurred on by these changes and the 
end of the Mao era and the rise of a more liberal Deng Xiaoping asked the same age-old 
question of how the central government could reconcile power sharing with the people. It 
was in a real context a question that was derived from three other questions -  why was 
China backward, how to invigorate the state with the people’s energy, and finally, how to 
reconcile popular participation. It was the “riddle of backwardness.” The concept of 
emperors remains strong in Chinese culture despite two revolutions in the twentieth 
century to eradicate the ancient feudal system.16
As the wall poster campaigns began fading and activists began turning to the next 
stage in the movement -  the political journal. The political journals, not overly 
sophisticated or lavishly produced, provided a key element wall posters could not and that 
was a much easier venue for greater readership. While many journals never produced mass 
copies of an issue, some as few as a hundred and at least one -  Masses ’ Reference News -  
produced a January 1979 issue of 20,000 copies, they all reached a much wider reading 
audience by simply being passed around hand-to-hand. Among the leading organizations 
and publications were Exploration (Tansuo), the Chinese Human Rights League, Beijing 
Spring, April Fifth Forum, the Enlightenment Society, the Thaw Society, Today, and the 
Masses ’ Reference News. Exploration was the most militant of the journals and was 
published by Wei. His journal was critical o f Marxist ideology, the Chinese government
l6Ibid.. xiii. 6.
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and Deng Xiaoping directly, though it also included articles on democracy and 
modernization, and the primitive conditions of political prisons.17
Publications that were published by the political activists came to be known as 
“people’s publications,” not wanting to be associated with official government 
publications nor those regarded as dissident and underground. Most people’s publications 
were actually published out o f someone’s apartment or home, which is amazing when you 
consider how small apartments are in Beijing. Usually publishing costs were paid by staff 
who took from meager wages to pay the cost o f publishing.18 Wei started publishing his 
journal -  Exploration -  while living at his father’s home at 118 Lane Four North, Fuwai, 
Beijing. When he constructed the journal, he was aiming at several things that included 
improving the material and spiritual life o f the Chinese people and creating the most 
rational social environment for the Chinese people. He proposed in his 9 January 1979 
issue to do those things within reasonable limits. The key to understanding Wei and his 
quest is in understanding that he wanted this evolution “as provided by the constitution.” 
He actually took the Chinese constitution at face value. He had an unfailing belief that if 
the constitution granted these individual rights, then he intended to avail himself o f them 
and encourage others to do so. It was his blessing and his curse. He said the Democracy 
Movement “has developed out o f the anti-bureaucracy movement of the Cultural 
Revolution and the anti-dictatorship movement centered around Xidan Democracy Wall.” 
Wei’s Fifth Modernization and Explorations marked him as more militant than moderate 
in projecting the democratic changes for modem China.19
1 Seymour. 15.
18 Nathan. Chinese Democracy. 15-17.
19 Seymour. 34.
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As a consequence of the diversity of the Democracy Movement, no one actually 
suggested how to democratize China in specific terms. Nearly all of the writings dealt with 
liberalization more at the theoretical level than the functional level. It was a subject of 
considerable discussion in the People’s Daily, Worker’s Daily, and China Youth. They 
discussed secret ballots by voters, choice among candidates for public office, and the 
ability to recall corrupt officials. Wei’s concept of human rights has been compared to that 
o f Luo Longji, leader of the Democratic League before and after the 1911 revolution, who 
wrote in 1929 that human rights were essential for life as a human being. Wei wrote an 
essay in March 1979 before his arrest in Explorations that was written under his pen name 
“Jin Sheng” that defines human rights, equality, and democracy. He held that human rights 
gave equality expression in society and preferred using the term “equal human rights 
issue” when discussing these three integrated concepts. Human rights for Wei did have 
limitations because of the environment and because they had to be constantly achieved. 
Politics was the means by which “people’s rights to manage their lives are either realized 
or suppressed.” Equality involved basic political rights that Wei defined as freedom of 
speech, assembly, association, the press, religion, movement, and right to strike by 
workers. When the Chinese have these basic political freedoms they will enjoy political 
and economic equality. He also stressed that equality did not mean averaging, but to a 
more complex understanding that involved similar opportunities and the same possibilities 
that could be used for different purposes. Finally, his concept of democracy centered on 
individual freedom of choice, which for an individual becomes possible when everyone’s 
rights and choices are accommodated. Democracy is “a social condition insuring that all 
have equal opportunities to attain their goals in life. Thus, democracy is a social system” -
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both political and economic.20
Wei believed China had two choices -  democracy or autocracy. He left no room 
for anything else and he accused Deng of manipulating the people and suspected that he 
might become a Maoist-style dictator. Wei attacked Deng directly in an essay in 
Explorations on 25 March 1979 in which he said that the people should only support his 
leadership as long as he continues to implement policies that provide for liberalism and 
freedom. He said that if Deng “follows a dictatorial road and acts contrary to the interests 
of the people, the people should oppose him.” Wei continued the attack saying that Deng 
had become an enemy of the people for violating basic democratic rights. He further 
advocated that people had to possess the right to vote and to have the power to dismiss 
officials from office. The day before his arrest on 29 March, the April Fifth Forum put up 
a wall poster that took issue with Wei’s essay on Deng, saying that Deng had done 
nothing to be labeled petty or a would-be autocrat. The poster went on to praise Deng’s 
work in correcting verdicts and permitting Democracy Wall to remain open. It argued that 
some regulations were necessary to foster the Democracy Movement not to ban it. Wei’s 
efforts at promoting reform from a more radical perspective resulted in arrest, and was 
later sentenced to fifteen years in prison as a counterrevolutionary. He was charged with 
providing information on the Sino-Vietnamese War to a foreign journalist. Wei argued in 
his own defense that the information came from published government sources. The same 
information was obtained by the Washington Post from the Foreign Ministry without 
objection. Deng had intended democratization to be limited and act as a vehicle to 
implement his Four Modernization’s. Wei broke through the ideology of the system and
:o Ibid.. 43. 141-45.
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attacked fundamental Chinese communist theories -  he had found Deng’s limits and 
exceeded them.21
Wei forced the authorities to react to him in a rather unusual way. His message 
that the Chinese have a right to democracy seems mild to the West, but to the Chinese it 
projects fear and revolutionary zeal the aging leadership was all too familiar with. He 
projected a charismatic fearlessness and evangelism o f freedom.22 He actually broke no 
laws. Instead, he quoted to the authorities their own words. He cited communist classics 
and requoted their own statements about human rights. Wei attempted to heed the legal 
system and cited the constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press, provided a liaison 
address, and tried to register and pay taxes. He broke with the other journals, though, 
when he refused to profess loyalty to the CCP or to Deng’s reformist political faction. He 
rejected “the absolute correctness o f any theory or person.”23 The regime was forced to 
react in a manner similar to Chairman Mao by quashing Wei’s rights of free speech 
because o f the depth and degree o f his attacks on the political institutions and Deng. It 
came about as Deng was trying to reign in the Democracy Movement. To a certain extent, 
Wei Jingsheng caused his own arrest because he was not heeding the unwritten rules of 
legal reform and free speech, or widening of the road.24
-^Ibid.. 23-25. 197-203.
~  Patrick E. Tyler. "Why Beijing Is So Afraid Of Mr. Wei." .Yew- York Times. 17 December 
1995. El.
■^Nathan. Chinese Democracy. 22.
24Wei. xi-xii.
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CHAPTER II
PERSPECTIVES ON REMONSTRANCE AND POLITICAL
REFORM
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution left two legacies -  on the one hand 
loomed anarchy, chaos, and breakdown of order, while on the other hand despotism and 
ideological fanaticism -  generating more demands for political reforms than traditional or 
external influences after the death of Mao Zedong. Elders in the CCP and government as 
well as those within the party-govemment aparatus who promoted reforms -  many of 
whom were persecuted in the “Ten Bad Years” -  offered differing perspectives on the 
future course of government. The party leadership wanted no repeat of the past and so 
they demanded unity, stability, party focus, authority, and communist orthodox ideology, 
meanwhile reform advocates within the party and government sought restraint on political 
power and the regularization of political procedures. Both perspectives were logical 
responses in the aftermath of the tumultuousness of the Cultural Revolution.1
The CCP was in a defensive posture as a result of the Cultural Revolution and its 
legitimacy and ideological underpinnings were undermined. The party laid the blame of the 
excesses of the Cultural Revolution on the radical Gang of Four -  Wang Hongwen, Zhang 
Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan -  and former PLA Chief Lin Biao for the 
distortion of ideology and rejecting standard party practices. Ba Jin is his Random 
Thoughts said the Cultural Revolution is a specter that haunts post-Mao China and is a 
“disaster without precedent in five thousand years of Chinese culture.” While they all
1 Merle Goldman. Sowing the Seeds o f Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng 
Xiaoping Era (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994). 15.
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agreed that China should never suffer the consequences of the momentous Great Leap 
Forward or the Cultural Revolution again, they were unable to reach a consensus on how 
to create safeguards and reforms to prevent it. Even Deng Xiaoping in a 1980 speech said 
the party’s excessive concentration of power at the top -  one of the issues repeatedly 
referred to as an obstacle to liberal reform -  had led to abuses. This political environment, 
then, widened the road to activism and criticism of ideology, government, and reforms. In 
this context the then-underdeveloped Democracy Movement found its voice after Deng 
instituted reforms beginning in 1978 and moved to the center of Beijing in late 1978 and 
early 1979 to launch the drive for sweeping political reforms.2 This then has become the 
central dilemma for the democracy activists in attempting to determine the course of 
reforms. It underscores the historical intellectual development over the past twenty years 
as the movement progressed from the wall posters stage to the June 4 Movement in 1989 
at Tiananmen Square
Many intellectuals began reviving ideas that stemmed from the May Fourth 
Movement of 1919 and later movements, which demonstrated that efforts by Mao to 
suppress them had been ineffective. The range of intellectual activity included 
individualism, Western Marxism, human rights, and Christianity. Deng also permitted 
intellectuals to renew Western contacts, travel to the West for study as well as academic 
conferences and meetings, and bring new ideas back to China. While the 4 June 1989 
Tiananmen Square crackdown with the use of elements of the People’s Liberation Army 
was predictable, the gradual shift in intellectual freedom during the Deng Xiaoping era 
became a significant milestone for evolving democratic thought. The intellectuals rejected
: Ibid.. 15-16.41.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
Maoist ideology because of the persecution they suffered and because of its failure to 
improve Chinese society.3
The intellectual movement was free for the first time in decades to pursue 
academic and cultural issues long controlled by Mao’s party-state aparatus. Intellectuals 
began open discussions of cultural values between China and the West, the new 
authoritarianism and democracy, and rule o f law and rule of the people. This period of 
liberalism flourished without the CCP orthodoxy or governmental position. Amid the 
party’s relaxation of ideological controls a growth of intellectual networks, study groups 
and even think tanks occurred. The Deng regime attempted to derive a consensus from 
among competing political factions while trying to maintain periods of control of political 
thought. There was repression, to be sure, but the duration of the repressive periods were 
far briefer than in Mao’s regime. Deng’s repression has had none of the fanaticism, mass 
mobilization, and terror of Mao. Often, too, the repression was restrained and channeled 
rather than wide and unbridled. It should be noted that Deng had been purged three times 
during his rise to paramount leadership and that altered his perspective on how to manage 
intellectuals and pro-democratic advocates. Hu Yaobang, chief of the state propaganda 
department, had hoped to revive interest in Marxism-Leninism as China’s viable political 
ideology. However, the problem with that stemmed from the intellectual realization that 
Marxism-Leninism had not brought prosperity to China -  the old riddle had not been 
answered -  and once again Chinese intellectuals were looking to the West and Japan and 
seeing prosperous, powerful nations that were democracies, exactly the opposite of what
3 Merle Goldman. "Politically-Engaged Intellectuals in the Deng-Jiang Era: A Changing 
Relationship with the Party-State.'* The China Quarterly no. 145 (March 1996): 35-36.
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China had become.4
In the early 1970s a schoolteacher named Chen Erjin wrote the first unofficial 
critique of existing Chinese socialism to ultimately reach the West. While he was not a 
major activist before or after his book, On Proletarian-Democratic Revolution, was 
published, Chen helped define certain critical issues that became major tenets of the 
Democracy Movement. The remarkable thing about his writing -  which emphasized 
institutionalized democracy, legality, and free speech -  is that it was done two years 
before the then-grassroots Democracy Movement moved onto center stage and shortly 
before the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976. Chen began his career as a teacher 
but was also active in the Cultural Revolution and became a leader of a “rebel” Red 
Guards group in Kunming where he taught. He attended a major rally of the Red Guards 
in Beijing in 1966 that was also attended by Mao, however, he did not become involved in 
the more violent aspects of the movement as it grew to the point of being out of control in 
later years. After the initial phase of the Cultural Revolution, Chen moved around various 
provinces teaching before returning to Kunming where he resumed teaching in the local 
school that was owned by a coal mining company. Finally, he went to work for the coal 
mining company as a statistician and it was during the early 1970s that he wrote On 
Proletarian-Democratic Revolution. He was arrested in 1978 and imprisoned for ten 
months for attempting to publish his book. During his prison term he was beaten and 
tortured, but he refused to renounce his political views. In June 1979 his book was 
published in a series of articles in an edition of the journal April Fifth Forum, which 
tended to mask its importance in understanding how democratic thought has evolved. The
4 Ibid.. 36-37.
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book was published in the West as China: Crossroads Socialism 5
Chen’s work is not a typical ideological representation or a crowning figure of the 
Democracy Movement. The movement produced thousands of pages of materials through 
books and unofficial journals that represents a truly diverse spectrum of political thought, 
some of which represent periods o f thought or critical issues. As such, Chen’s work more 
correctly belongs to the period of the closing years o f Mao’s regime, and provides a vital 
link between the Mao era and the post-Mao era.6
Chen believed that if democracy, legal reform, and other institutional measures 
were instituted then an era o f emancipated political thought would follow. In relationship 
to other democracy activists, Chen’s perspective is similar, though he precedes the 
Democracy Movement by more than five years. The Chinese people never lacked the 
talent or ability to survive and function in a democratic environment, Chen believed, citing 
the ancient Spring and Autumn periods in the era of the Warring States when the “hundred 
schools of thought” contended in a harmonious spirit. Again in the aftermath of the 1911 
Revolution, the Nationalist Republic “brought about a faint reappearance in China of such 
intellectual diversity and contention.” However, feudalism and the inexperienced Chinese 
people, who had not sufficiently been exposed to democracy to understand how to 
implement it, prevented that period from leading to a greater life for modem China. Chen 
was aware that a new reform faction had arisen within the party as a consequence of the 
Cultural Revolution, though some feared the faction was still under the control of the 
Dengist leadership group that had grown up around Deng Xiaoping, whose political
5 Chen Eijin. China: Crossroads Socialism. An Unofficial Manifesto for Proletarian Democracy. 
trans. Robin Munro (London: Verso Editions and NLB. 1984). 1-5.
6 Ibid.. 15.
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revival had begun shortly before the death of Premier Zhou Enlai. Chen, though, did not 
concur with the concept that was beginning to develop among the emerging democracy 
advocates that “the awakening of the people is historically inevitable,” and that the people 
were ready to assume a broader role in their own governance. He argued within the 
Marxist context that the system o f proletarian democracy should combine public 
ownership of the means of production with a government that was o f the people and by 
the people, or more clearly the consent of the governed, that would thus “constitute a 
socialist system of an entirely new type.” Further, it would be a socialist system that 
provided for universal suffrage and guaranteed human rights. “The proletarian-democratic 
system must and will ensure the ability of the working people genuinely to hold power.”7 
The political leadership would govern China in Chen’s formula with the consent of the 
majority, and it would respect actual individual freedoms, and not just nominal freedoms 
that had been previously provided in the respective Chinese constitutions.
The Chinese constitution and its respective revisions have proved to be an 
important focal point for political activists throughout the twenty years since the first big 
character posters began appearing on Democracy Wall. The constitution provides basic 
civil liberties that are found in most Western constitutions, though it is critical to realize 
that China has no constitutional tradition. Constitutional law was not introduced until after 
the 1911 Nationalist Revolution. Wei Jingsheng carried his faith in the value of the civil 
liberties contained in the document twice into China’s prisons -  basing his defense on the 
expressed freedoms. Chen Eijin wanted to see a government respect the individual rights 
contained in the constitution, and not just pay nominal respect to its provisions. Many
'  Ibid.. 43.154.
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others have voiced similar views. That was precisely the case with Fang Lizhi, an educator 
who belonged to the party but was purged because of his democratic views on education 
and the reform of government.
In 1958 the Chinese Communist Party expelled Fang Lizhi, an astrophysicist, 
during the Anti-Rightist Movement, one of a number of purges concocted by Mao Zedong 
that led up to the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Fang was expelled for his early writings -  
which criticized the Chinese educational system -  while working and teaching at the 
Institute of Modem Physics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences Fang’s outspokenness of 
the educational system in China was what led to his political activism ultimately. 
Nevertheless, Fang continued to profess his belief in communism and the leadership of 
Chairman Mao, and China needed his critical scientific skills more than his political loyalty 
so he was permitted to remain at his post at the Institute of Modem Physics. He moved 
from the Institute to help establish the University of Science and Technology (Kextie Jishit 
Daxue or Keda) in Beijing. Later during the Cultural Revolution Fang was struggled 
against and was sent down to the countryside where he spent a year in Anhui Province, 
working in a mine and on a railroad. It was during his confinement that Fang began to 
question Mao’s leadership. While in Anhui he had begun to realize that the China Mao 
described was not the China that he was actually seeing -  coming to the realization that 
the party and the government had deceived the people and they could not be trusted any 
longer. Fang said that as a youth he had developed a sense of duty, responsibility, and 
loyalty to the country, “but what I saw around me made me feel that the leaders weren’t 
similarly concerned about the country and weren’t shouldering responsibility for its 
people.” In 1969, he moved again in Anhui Province to teach and study astrophysics in a
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new university (Keda) established by the Academy of Science *
By 1978, Fang had become fully rehabilitated, rejoined the CCP, and regained 
tenure at Keda and a full professorship. With the death of Mao and the arrest of the Gang 
of Four two years earlier, and the ascension of Deng Xiaoping to power, circumstances in 
China had begun to change dramatically for the academic community. Fang was permitted 
to travel abroad to attend scientific conferences and seminars and that led to a major 
turning point in his political development. His first trip abroad was in 1978 to attend a 
conference in Munich, and he traveled to the United States in 1986 to visit and study at 
Princeton University. These trips accomplished a number of things beyond academic travel 
-  they helped him attain an increasing international stature, and also expanded his 
intellectual study into education, politics, and philosophy.9
Fang became vice president of Keda, and his colleague, Guan Weiyan, became the 
university’s president. They quickly moved forward with major educational reforms and 
changed the system to gradually remove the party’s political leadership from the academic 
fields and give wider decision making to the university administration. Still, these reforms 
proved too radical for the CCP to tolerate very long and by 1987 Fang was reassigned to 
the Beijing Observatory and Guan was reassigned to the Institute of Physics. There had 
been an outbreak of student demonstrations across college campuses in China and the 
party wanted to chill talk o f liberalization of the political system. Fang had been accused of 
having ignored the Four Cardinal Principles, and he had come under attack from the press 
as well as Deng Xiaoping himself. The foreign press and outside world began touting
8 Fang Lizhi. Bringing Down The Great Wall: Writings on Science, Culture and Democracy in 
China, trans. and eds. James H. Williams. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1990). xiii, xvii-xviii.
9 Ibid.. xix-xx.
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Fang’s efforts at academic reform as well as his outspokenness of China’s political system. 
Many Chinese intellectuals applauded at the very least his boldness if not his political 
views entirely. The party, for its part, was caught in an extremely poor position. To 
persecute Fang now after some liberalization would invite accusations of another Anti- 
Rightist Movement that would simply put the party in an even worse light after opening 
China. The party was unable to find the middle way (zhongyong), a political position 
revered by classical Chinese political philosophers. The CCP in 1987 expelled Fang once 
again -  hoping at one level to use only a mild punishment to make clear it was not going 
back to the past, but also to demonstrate that there were still limits and the party remained 
the centerpiece of Chinese political power. Finally in 1989, Fang wrote a personal letter to 
Deng, calling on him to release political prisoners and Wei Jingsheng. This opened up a 
deluge of letters from other Chinese intellectuals calling for greater freedoms and 
liberalization.10
Fang wrote an essay in April 1989 to commemorate the May Fourth Movement of 
1919 -  which was a student protest over China ceding large amounts of Chinese territory 
to the Japanese in the Treaty of Versailles after World War I. Fang told the Chinese 
people not to despair over the hope that democracy would one day achieve stature in 
China. He said that the “basic principles and standards of modernization and 
democratization are like those o f science -  universally applicable. In this regard there’s no 
Eastern or Western standard, only the difference between ‘backward’ and ‘advanced,’ 
between ‘correct’ and ‘mistaken’.” What had kept modernization and democratization out 
o f China was what kept science out for so long, Fang said -  the theory of China’s unique
10 Ibid.. xx-xxxviii.
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characteristics.11 However, after the 4 June 1989 demonstrations Fang and his wife, Li 
Shuxian, were in the United States Embassy in Beijing seeking political asylum and hoping 
to leave China. They were finally allowed to leave China 25 June 1990, and Fang took up 
residence at the Institute of Astronomy at Cambridge University, but moved again in 
January 1991 to Princeton at the Institute of Advanced Study.
Fang came to the Democracy Movement not as a disenfranchised young political 
activist, but as a noted physicist and member of the CCP. He came into conflict with the 
CCP after he made public comments in December 1980 criticizing Marxism. He said that 
“Marxism has become ossified, in its rigid adherence to obsolete conclusions that have led 
to failure. It is only realistic to predict that the crisis of faith in Marxism is going to have a 
profound effect on China, and especially on the next generation.” He argued that 
civilization has passed through many stages, and it might be that Marxist culture is just 
another stage. The success or failure of China’s reforms, he said, was highly problematic 
and not completely certain. For China to survive part of the solution was that there must 
be advances in science and technology, but not just for economic development because 
that alone does not contain the whole answer. In the West and in Japan, science and 
technology have affected all aspects of development, but “economics is not the only mark 
of development .” Other factors in development include the equitable distribution of 
wealth, social order, and the lack of political corruption. Certainly, in the long view,
China’s feudal history can account for some of its backwardness, but in the recent past it 
has been the orthodoxy that has ruled China for the previous thirty years. Part of the 
problem could be laid to the numerous political purges that have fostered suspicion among
11 Ibid.. 38-42.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
the people and the hatred of learning. The Cultural Revolution is one such example, he 
said, it destroyed a generation of Chinese scholars and intellectuals, and it explains why 
the country’s intellectual standards have been so low. He blamed Mao for the condition 
the country was in when Deng and his regime came to power -  though it was true that 
Deng, as a policymaker, was also guilty of many of the problems the Cultural Revolution 
generated. He said Mao’s highly negative opinion of education and learning in China may 
well damage and retard the reforms of the Deng era.12
Fang’s criticism of Mao was a recurring theme in his view of the future of China 
and the means best suited for helping China achieve its goals. He argued that in the time of 
Marx industry often meant coal mining and raw steel production, but clearly not in the age 
China now found itself. Fang argued strongly that science and technology held the keys to 
new innovation, and as such the vanguard of the working class should be the intellectuals, 
which Mao so disdained, as the most capable of leading China. Until education and 
learning are given their rightful place in Chinese society there would continue to be 
problems with the modernization programs of the Deng era. Fang believed that China 
would follow the economic formula of many Western nations and Japan moving from an 
agrarian economy to industrialization, and into high technology. If China followed the 
notion of Mao and made intellectuals into laborers, then in the long run it would prove 
costly to China’s future. Intellectuals, Fang believed, did not represent just a force for 
production, but they were also a force for social progress through thought and culture. If 
the intellectuals do not play a key role in China’s future, then “without our efforts, the 
myriad problems that face China, both social and technical, will not be resolved, and
Ibid.. 91-108.
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China’s attempts at reform will certainly be abortive.”13
In an interview with Chinese journalists in September 1986, Fang argued that one 
of Chinese system’s weaknesses was its narrow exclusion of other perspectives on politics, 
which had come to dominate political thought under Mao and to a lesser extent under the 
Deng regime. He advocated that China make a break with ti-yong, which is a term taken 
from ancient Chinese metaphysics but adapted in the nineteenth century to mean “taking 
Chinese learning for the essential things, taking Western learning for the practical 
application,” but avoiding Western cultural influences such as religion and politics. Fang 
wanted China to embrace openness, adding that the most important factor in political 
reform was democratization -  though he believed that it could take China another 
generation to fully realize democratization. He regarded Deng’s policies of “loosening up” 
as inherently limited in its range and scope, because he believed democracy is the right of 
citizens. Democracy gives the people the opportunity to speak from divergent 
perspectives, but “demanding that the people always speak with one voice is a bad idea.”14 
However, Fang moves closer to the central theme o f democratic theory when he 
questions who government ultimately serves -  the people or a political party. The People’s 
Republic was founded by a political party that said it was there to serve the people, but at 
the same time the party has said it provided for the people and the people must serve well.
It then raises the question as to who serves and who grants authority. However, a lesson 
Fang learned from his travels, especially in the United States, was that democracy is not a 
thing that can be granted to the people by the government. Fang presents an interesting
13 Ibid. 110-113.
14 Ibid.. 121. 127-129.
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parallel, for it was Liang Qichao who also visited the United States to learn from its 
democracy and was also troubled by what he saw in the context of what would be right 
for China. Fang said that while visiting and studying at Princeton, he actually received a 
regular mailing from the U.S. Representative for that Congressional District explaining in 
some detail what he was doing for the people of his district in Washington, D C To an 
American such mail is taken very much for granted, which may explain why Americans 
regularly ignore it. Under China’s socialist democracy, Fang said no citizen would ever 
receive such a letter from a representative to the National People’s Congress (NPC). In 
every instance Fang said China’s representative body should behave better than a similar 
legislative body in the West. It is every citizen’s right to raise his voice and to enjoy 
opportunities the political system offers, to not be able to speak is feudalism, which is 
completely inconsistent with the current age. The Chinese system, though claiming to be a 
socialist democracy, all too often practices privilege, such as selecting officials for the 
cadre system on the basis of informed recommendations -  a practice that would not be 
found in a functioning democracy. The people should be able to supervise the nomination 
and appointment of public officials, and these officials should be subject to public 
oversight “the same way that there is nothing outside the universe itself to set things in 
motion, there is also no authority higher than the masses of ordinary people; it is therefore 
the people that must be the ultimate force.” Fang argues that the rights contained in the 
Chinese Constitution are similar to those found in other developed nations such as Japan 
or the United States, but the problem arises when it comes to the understanding of such 
issues, which are quite different in China. The people’s rights -  meaning those in
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developed nations -  demand accountability, while China’s bestows privileges. In 
attempting to characterize the Chinese experience with individual rights, he says that “we 
are endlessly hoisting new banners up the flagpole, but the feudal essence of the thing 
itself has never changed.” He draws a very interesting conclusion about political reform 
and expansion of individual rights when he argues that reform and democracy have to 
begin within the CCP. It has always been difficult to develop a pluralist system in China 
because the single perspective has prevailed in the country for six thousand years.15
Targeting reform to just a few sectors of Chinese life is little more than a pipe 
dream, Fang said in a 1986 speech to the Conference on Reform of the Political Structure 
held in Hefei, Anhui Province. In that speech Fang said that since the modernization 
reforms had begun and were proceeding “there is a clear mandate for political reform as 
well.” A critical first step is to fully recognize that China is backward in many areas such 
as food production and industrial development, but Fang said there is also a spiritual crisis, 
a crisis of morality, and of ideals. Without acknowledging shortcomings, no 
comprehensive reform can be made. He said that reform, as Deng Xiaoping once 
remarked, is revolution. This is an interesting set of remarks by Fang because it was 
China’s shortcomings that Deng targeted with his launch of the Four Modernization’s. 
Though, Fang does place his perspective within the context of the socialist system, saying 
that the time had come to face the facts directly and realize that socialism has not been 
successful by comparison to the rest of the developed world. He cited a lack of substantive 
progress in three decades in China or the Soviet Union. Additionally, he illustrated that 
argument with the case of East and West Germany. East Germany before World War II
15 Ibid.. 129-133.
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had been more industrialized than West Germany, but since the partitioning of Germany 
West Germany has become far more advanced. China should not be blaming feudalism for 
its current dilemma, but should be examining the past three decades for the failed 
practices, facing the problems, and then moving on to reforms. If China continues to 
disguise its problems “with the mask of socialist superiority, then reforms cannot be 
implemented and will not succeed.” Fang takes his argument to a much further stage in 
suggesting that if China is to advance it becomes essential to learn from the West and 
incorporate that into the country’s reforms -  conceding of course that Western developed 
nations are not without their own problems. He raises the specter o f 103 years of intense 
debate about the riddle of China’s backwardness by adding that “if we want things to 
change, ‘complete Westernization’ is the most viable approach. What I mean by ‘complete 
Westernization’ is complete openness to the outside world, assimilating all of the cultural 
advances of the human race.” China has had its influence on Asia and even portions of 
Europe, he said, so it is logically time for the West and other Asian nations to have their 
influence on China, without blindly fearing that it may destroy China’s vast culture. Fang 
said China has compounded its problems by the self-imposed isolation of Marxism, 
deeming everything Western worthless. Openness is a vital link in the political reform 
process, and a key component of democratization. Fang said that, as Wei Jingsheng has so 
eloquently argued, new laws to guarantee freedoms are not necessary, they already exist in 
the nation’s constitution and all that is required is strict compliance. Part of his formula 
requires making the National People’s Congress a legitimate representative body that does 
the work of the Chinese people. He had seen the nature of the United States Congress and 
believed that China should expect no less. Finally, he argues that in the West people are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 6
permitted to disagree strongly with each other and still retain respect for opposing views. 
In China because of ancient patterns of orthodoxy, people feel that any question requires 
only one absolutely correct answer, variations become troublesome which impedes 
progress -  because the essence of democracy is that there is always more than one 
answer. It is the thing that makes democracy so vibrant and so fluid.16
A detectable shift begins to occur during the 1980s in China with the evolution of 
democratic thought, first with Fang Lizhi whose own writings moved further than the 
original work of the Democracy Movement, but also with the writings of Yan Jiaqi, who 
was China’s foremost political scientist until May 1989 when he broke with the CCP. The 
shift in thought moves from an attempt to formalize democratic political thought as in the 
wall poster stage of the Democracy Movement to one of change through specific reforms. 
We see this evolution specifically in the writings of Fang and Yan.
For Yan Jiaqi, the pursuit of democracy in China has taken a decidedly more 
ominous turn. Escaping China after the 4 June 1989 crackdown by the PLA, Yan has 
become the president o f the Front for a Democratic China (Zhongguo Minzhu Zhenxian). 
He no longer hopes for political reform in China, but an outright democratic revolution in 
political thought.17
Yan began his academic career attending the University of Science and 
Technology as a student o f Fang Lizhi -  the connection to Fang, who was China’s 
foremost political activist from 1985-1989, was a critical linkage to Yan’s own evolution 
from a budding career in science to a much more influential position in political science.
Ibid. 135-155.
1 Yan Jiaqi. Yan Jiaqi and China s Struggle fo r Democracy, trans. and eds. David M. Bachman 
and Dali L. Yang (Armonk. N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. Inc.. 1991) xiii.
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He eventually became the director of the Institute of Political Science in the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences from 1985-89 What prevented him from staying in science 
was the Great Leap Forward campaign, though he did eventually graduate with a degree 
in physics in 1964. He later entered postgraduate study in philosophy in the Philosophy 
and Social Sciences Division of the Academy of Sciences. What he saw happen to China 
during the Great Leap Forward campaign changed his perspective on life and the future of 
the Chinese people.
He published an essay in 1980 in New Era (Xin shiqi) that was later reprinted in 
Ouanli yii zhenli In that essay he calls for political reform and democratization of the 
Chinese political system through popular elections, a system of checks and balances, and 
the separation o f powers, which is a major advance in the direction reform should follow 
We do not see similar reforms discussed by Wei Jingsheng in his writings, but that is 
because of the evolutionary changes that occurred. Yan believes that this reform will 
finally quash feudalism in China, which he defines as a regime based on a unified 
centralized empire -  something China had not escaped after the fall of the imperial system 
in 1911 and the evolution to two republican regimes. This connotation of the term 
feudalism -  which appears repeatedly throughout democratic activists’ writings -  means 
overconcentrated and absolute political power. It was an autocracy based on the theory 
that authority of the sovereign was indivisible and nontransferable. Yan said in 1980 that 
there still exists many vestiges of the heavy feudal autocratic system. However to begin 
with, China must clean away the “influences of feudal autocracy in our thinking, we must 
also start with the removal of the expressions of feudal autocracy in our national system -  
the over centralization and non-transferability of supreme state power -  in order to
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annihilate these feudal remnants.”18
Two years after his earliest essay, Yan wrote in Illumination Daily (Guangming
ribao) a carefully worded essay that suggested the means for reform might lie with
allowing the Chinese people greater access through the constitutional processes of the
1982 constitution. He attempted to suggest to the government that radical reforms could
be avoided if the constitutional freedoms were given wider observance. He said:
If the people cannot influence the choice of the actual power holders, if the actual 
administrative power holders have lifetime tenure, then the people will be unable to 
influence state policy and will find it hard to express their wishes and demands 
through established channels.19
The major revisions in the 1982 constitution allowed the National People’s 
Congress to elect the state president, chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, and 
premier with the intention of instilling greater public participation without actually 
allowing direct elections by the people. Yan, attempting to act the role of an inside 
reformer, praised the policy of tenure in state positions, but with limits. Limited tenure in 
office was a significant improvement because it ended a tradition that spanned thousands 
of years.20
Yan echoed an argument advanced by Fan Lizhi earlier that called for greater 
intellectual autonomy in all fields of creation as a part of his overall perspective on liberal 
reforms. He argued that intellectuals must have a greater sense of freedom both internally 
and externally. Academic freedom -  though a condition for scientific development -  is 
also a goal scholars must achieve in seeking truth.
18 Ibid. xiv-xv. 10-15.
19 Ibid. 15-20.
20 Ibid. 20-21.
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One of the difficulties faced by political scientists and historians in the modern 
Chinese political system is that they have very limited access to the operations o f 
government, and likewise are rarely called upon to offer expert advice to the government 
-  a condition that is not common in the West where the academic community regularly 
interacts with the government. Citing the German-born physicist Albert Einstein who fled 
fascist Germany, Yan said that one’s thought can not be bound by authority or social 
prejudice, which figured into the dilemma faced by the democracy activists in China. He 
said the question of how to build a highly democratic socialist political system was both 
political and academic. To help achieve the goals of a liberal system there has to be full 
academic freedom or “there will not be the study and investigation of what is politically 
highly democratic, let alone the actual construction o f high levels of democracy in the 
political sphere.” It is the freedom of choice that gives vent to creativity21
In another interview with the Guangming ribao 30 June 1986, Yan linked the 
economic prosperity of China with democracy. He argues that some short-term economic 
improvement might be achieved within the current political framework, but long-term 
prosperity depends on the nation evolving to democracy with considerably less centralized 
power. To foster this approach, Yan suggests that a system of checks and balances be 
created among agencies and branches of government that would create a degree of 
individual autonomy through the political structure in decision making. The aim of checks 
and balances cuts to a much more central theme of the entire Democracy Movement, and 
that is to prevent any future Cultural Revolutions. The desire is to prevent the government
2! Ibid.. 38-40.
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from violating human rights, and to create a reform environment that fully integrates 
popular involvement in government.22
Yan in 1988 at the International Symposium on the Political and Economic 
Modernization in Chinese Societies held in Hong Kong said the 1911 Revolution that 
ushered in the Republican era failed to produce democracy, it only created an environment 
for traditional warlord politics. It also created a new dictatorial dynasty with a colonial 
tinge. Later in 1949, Mao Zedong led the most successful peasant revolt in all the history 
o f China since the Taiping Rebellion. But history has its own laws of development, Yan 
said, and no one can escape the limits placed on his own era. The Cultural Revolution 
underscores that condition and the outcome o f the Mao regime. The Cultural Revolution 
proved to be an era of rampant feudalism, and not the continuing revolution under the 
dictatorship of the proletariat Mao had proclaimed from the Gate of Heavenly Peace in 
1966 at Tiananmen Square. After forty years o f de facto supreme power, power was still 
held by one individual. In China, because the party has direct control over the government, 
there are in fact two governments. Yan said the CCP holds power over the government 
that was created by the constitution -  but power still is concentrated in the hands of one 
individual whether it was Mao or Deng Xiaoping or someone else. Though there has been 
some separation between party and state since the death of Mao, there is still “a unitary 
and pyramid-shaped power structure.” The constitution vests all power in the National 
People’s Congress as the highest organ of state power, though it rarely exercises state 
power, and for that reason it is difficult for the people to understand the value in the
“  Ibid. 48-53.
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separation of functions and powers between party and government.23
Reforming China, Yan concludes, will be a very long-term process, “it is at once a 
process for building ‘democratic politics’ and a process for changing a China of personal 
rule into one ruled by law.” China will be greatly aided in its evolution with the adoption 
of party-govemment separation, improvement in the National People’s Congress system, 
creation o f a civil service system, building an independent judiciary, and the guarantee of 
fundamental constitutional freedoms.24
23 Ibid. 98-104.
24 Ibid. 107.
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CHAPTER III 
WEI JINGSHENG’S CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY
Wei Jingsheng traveled extensively in China during the late 1960s and early 1970s 
as a member o f the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution and later as a squad 
commander in the Chinese Army. He saw poverty and inequality throughout the country, 
readily equating it with the autocratic socialist politics he had once been fanatical about -  
which brought him to criticize Mao’s dictatorship, quarrel with his supervisor at the 
Beijing Zoo where he worked as an electrician, be disapproved for CCP membership, and 
suspended from the Youth League. His life was at turning point by the mid-1970s after a 
four-year tour in the PLA and passing up a chance for a low-level government position. A 
key event on 5 April 1976 -  the demonstration at Tiananmen Square to memorialize the 
passing of Zhou Enlai -  brought Wei to the conclusion that China had to change.
By 1978, Wei was living at home with his father, but his father, a devout Maoist, 
began criticizing him for his publishing activities, suggesting that he was a 
counterrevolutionary, which was a serious indictment in China. Wei, in turn, accused his 
father, who had been a deputy director in the State Capital Construction Commission, of 
feudalism, patriarchalism, and bureaucratism.1 Wei rejected his Marxist and Maoist 
upbringing in much the same way that Liang Qichao began moving from his classical 
Confucian-based education toward Western concepts of democratic thought. For Liang, 
the “riddle of backwardness” could not be adequately dealt with by China’s imperial 
system, because the prosperous nations o f the world were Western and democratic. If
'Nathan. Chinese Democracy. 22.
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China was the middle kingdom, or Zhong Guo, then it rightly should have been the 
prosperous nation, but it was not. It was feudal and backward.
Wei Jingsheng was confronted with a similar dilemma. If socialism held the answer 
to resolving China’s backwardness, then why was it still a terribly poverty stricken nation 
and still underdeveloped by comparison to the West, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, 
and Taiwan, whose standard of living and economies were vastly superior to China’s. 
When Deng Xiaoping first began promoting his program of Four Modernization’s for the 
economic revival of China, democracy activists believed the time had arrived to push the 
campaign onto the public stage and political posters began appearing in late 1978. 
However, it was an awkward time for the Democracy Movement because it lacked 
cohesion and a unified spirit, bordering almost on the fractious. The movement’s main 
purpose was to encourage the development of a modem democracy for China, to be sure, 
though at times various factions would turn on each other, weakening its overall message 
to the government. An authoritarian government need not be terribly repressive if its major 
opposition movement is weakened from within by a failure to develop a unified strategy 
beyond theoretical arguments and paper wall posters. The CCP understood the nature of 
politics of change extremely well. It had waged a desperate struggle from the very early 
1920s to win a revolution against all odds by late 1949 -  and its most important attributes 
were strong leadership, intense loyalty and a unified strategy. Most of its struggle was 
against a superior opponent that had considerable external support, wealth, and resources, 
but an extremely weak leadership more concerned with its own aggrandizement than the 
democratization of China. Unseating the entrenched CCP and converting China to a
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democracy characterized by popular participation would not easily be done with words 
and posters alone.
Wei Jingsheng visited the Democracy Wall several weeks after posters began 
appearing, but during that visit he was inspired to craft his own and in direct response to 
Deng. He wrote The Fifth Modernization: Democracy in a single night and it was posted 
the following night by a friend at two o ’clock in the morning. The journey to that moment 
was long and instructive. Wei Shanshan, his sister and a college student, recalled telling 
Wei the poster had become a major topic of discussion on campus at the time not realizing 
he had written it, but she expressed grave concern for his safety when she found out. Wei 
had already spent time in prison during the Cultural Revolution and nearly everyone 
involved with the Democracy Wall movement had been under close surveillance by the 
Bureau of Public Security. The poster, though, provided Wei with instant recognition and 
clearly thrust him into the height of the Democracy Movement2 The essay to the people 
o f China met with a mix of reactions from those who feared the government’s reaction to 
expressions of refreshing ideas. Many, though, found the essay difficult to accept because 
of their years of orthodox Marxist education. According to Yale Historian Jonathan D 
Spence, the writings of the early Democracy Wall spoke well of the need for greater 
political liberalism, but few spoke with the impact of Wei’s ability to confront Deng 
Xiaoping directly3 He argued in his big character poster for the representation of the 
people in government, who would act in their interests without regard to the CCP He 
argued for minzhu, the people are masters, which is the closest the Chinese language
:Wei. 253.
3 Jonathan D. Spence. The Search for Modem China (New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
1990). 662-663.
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comes to the word democracy To Wei, democracy was not as Lenin had claimed solely 
the result of social development, but also a condition for development of higher forces. 
Without democracy, Wei believes Chinese society will die and economic growth will 
flounder along with Deng’s four economic initiatives -  which have been institutionalized 
by the National People’s Congress. The CCP had not solved China’s dilemma and 
collectivism of the socialist countries -  which were among the poorest -  left no room for 
individualism or initiative. The democracy movement had fought with ideas, but not with 
the force that could bring about immediate change 4
Wei argued for a civil rights-based democratic system, a concept relatively alien to 
Chinese political thought. While Liang Qichao argued for liberalism and Sun Zhongsan 
sought a republican political system, Wei added the measure of individual liberties as the 
centerpiece of society. Chinese thought centered on social interests dominating individual 
interests, requiring a centralized system of management or administration -  the basis of all 
previous Chinese leadership. This is a reflection of the Confucian concept of social 
harmony, where relationships are more important than the individual. Therefore, China 
was best served, the argument went, by either a minority or single person creating the best 
centralized autocracy Wei altered the order making the individual the central character 
and making society serve and respect his interests and rights. He added to his theory the 
term “human rights,” which had rarely appeared in a century in Chinese democratic 
thought. These rights are heaven-given and are not bestowed by any external government, 
they are, in Wei’s concept, inherent. Socialism tends toward democracy, Wei argues, but 
because it has arisen in largely backward countries with feudal traditions, it has given up
4Ibid. 662-64.
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democracy for autocratic leaders. Wei supported the idea of political primacy of rights, 
but few others in the democracy movement did. He advanced the thought that rights had 
to be satisfied by the government. In the final analysis, Wei argued that the purpose of 
citizens’ rights were not to protect the individual entirely, but to enable citizens to 
strengthen the state. Citizens’ rights have been a part of China’s constitutional system, but 
they were regarded as a grant from the state to the citizen so the citizen could better serve 
the nation. The first principles were contained in a document in 1908 under the Qing 
Dynasty5
The new regime promised no deceptive policies, no great helmsman, no class 
struggle, and no more revolution, Wei wrote in his essay The Fifth Modernization.
Instead, the regime promised wise leadership, the Four Modernization’s, and the value of 
higher education, but the regime did not promise democracy or liberalization. Wei wrote 
that for thirty years the Chinese people followed Mao Zedong’s empty promises and 
consistently came up empty-handed. When Deng rose to power and called for practicality, 
the people’s spirits rose as fast as Deng assumed greater power and control o f the 
government, though Wei said the signs were evident that Mandst-Leninist-Mao Zedong 
Thought was still the foundation of government ideology. The fear, then, was that nothing 
had changed. The new regime said the people did not need democracy because the country 
had democracy under a centralized leadership. Wei warned that those not willing to accept 
the regime would easily find an empty prison cell waiting for them. The new promise 
offered by the regime was the prosperity of communism with the Four Modernization’s. 
Wei said that the people learned from the Cultural Revolution and no longer believed in
5Nathan. Chinese Democracy. 104-107.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
the leadership’s promises.6
Though Wei describes democracy in the context of minzhu, he more precisely says 
the people are the masters of history, a concept more familiar with Marxism. Without the 
effort and participation of the Chinese people, there can be no history, no great helmsman, 
or wise leader. When the regime said the people are the master of history it is hollow so 
long as people are not permitted to determine their own destiny. It is equally troubling 
when their achievements are credited to others and rights stripped away For Wei, the 
people in this broad context of Chinese society -  as Mao had said -  are not master, but 
they should be:
When they call for democracy they are demanding nothing more than that which is 
inherently theirs. Whoever refuses to return democracy to them is a shameless thief 
more despicable than any capitalist who robs the workers of the wealth earned 
with their own sweat and blood.7
Wei then says something very interesting is his essay -  he said that when the 
people embraced the CCP over the Guomindang (CNP) it was because they were seeking 
democracy, the people were to become the masters, echoing CCP promises of 1949 to 
make the people masters of the country. It is an interesting perspective on the outcome of 
the 1949 Communist Revolution, which marks the Second Republic. What happened to 
the promises, he asks of the government. They championed the dictatorship of the 
proletariat rather than a people’s democratic dictatorship. It is not completely clear from 
his essay exactly what is meant by the “people are the masters of history” -  though it 
stems from Marxist ideology -  or how Wei defines what history is in this context, but it 
seems to indicate the connotation that the power to govern must emanate from the people
6Wei. 202-203.
Ibid.. 203-204.
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and that the state derives its authority to govern from them, which is an interpretation of 
the Western Social Contract Theory. Mao had converted the concept of Mandate of 
Heaven from ancient times into Mandate of the People to support his ideology. The best 
understanding of Wei’s writings indicates that during the time before he finished his essay 
The Fifth Modernization he apparently came into contact with some readings that 
reflected current Western thinking. Despite his leanings toward a democratic republic, Wei 
still uses the language o f the Marxist -  a concept that has become known as “internal 
oppression.” He reminds the people that when Peng Dehuai spoke too freely at the 1959 
Lushan Conference, he was later denounced for complying with the orders of the “great 
leader.” Mao had sought open criticism of every aspect o f political life in China and the 
conference was to be a centerpiece of that campaign 8
Wei in his assessment o f China’s conditions in 1978 attempted to answer two key 
questions -  first, were the people satisfied, and second, what must be done next In the 
first instance Wei’s essay indicates the people were not satisfied with their plight and they 
were more backward than before the communists came to power. It is not expressly 
stated, but it is implied that the backwardness is in comparison with the West and within 
the region. Backwardness in the context used by Chinese democratists really is concerned 
with its political development and economic growth. The authoritarian government o f the 
CCP has been regarded by the democracy activists as very similar to the ancient imperial 
system without the imperial trappings. Its economic development has not been improved 
by communist leadership or planning -  contributing further to the country’s continued 
backwardness. What to do about the backwardness raises a series o f questions and issues
"Ibid.. 204.
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for Wei. The first question involves the relevance of the successes and failures of Mao’s 
tenure -  was it even necessary. He asks if there had been no Mao Zedong leadership 
would China have fallen into its current condition. Essentially then would China have been 
better off or worse without Mao’s 27-year, authoritarian leadership, and Wei responds 
saying it would probably have been better without Mao because the Chinese people should 
not have followed the path they chose. It is an amplification of many arguments that had 
followed the Cultural Revolution. He arrives at this juncture as much for his own clarity of 
thinking as to the conclusion that the socialist road he followed was wasted. He argues, 
though, that the Chinese people really were not given any alternative and would very likely 
have been crushed by Mao’s military forces and his dictatorship would have developed 
regardless. The path China chose with the Second Republic was the socialist road. By that 
logic Wei suggests that in socialism the masses, or proletariat, are the masters, but do the 
Chinese people regard themselves as masters of anything. The truth is the people are 
mastered by others “even down to your own marriages.”9
Workers in a socialist state are entitled to receive any surplus from their labors 
after all duties and obligations are fulfilled. The Chinese did not enjoy that privilege during 
Mao’s tenure, though, after Deng consolidated power he began permitting greater 
personal control over individual workers among other reform measures to improve the 
nation’s productivity both in agriculture and industry. Socialism, Wei argues, was 
supposed to provide improved education for every citizen, but it failed the Chinese there 
too. The dictatorship of the proletariat has not led to the ideal world of Chinese socialism, 
but instead similar to the feudal socialism described in the Communist Manifesto. Feudal
9Ibid, 204-205.
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socialism, like the Soviet Union’s socialist imperialism and Hitler’s national socialism, has 
but one enemy and that is democracy Both political systems caused slavery and poverty 
for their peoples, but Wei said must the Chinese continue to suffer as the others have, or 
must it choose the other alternative -  democracy. To modernize China, Wei said, means 
that “we must first modernize our people and our society ”
Wei believes that the kind of democracy the Chinese people want is “simply to 
have a chance to enjoy a happy life, or at least one that is no less than what people enjoy 
in other countries. A prosperity that all members of society can enjoy equally will only be 
achieved by raising the level of social productivity ” Nevertheless, even with democracy, 
the Chinese would still face problems with allocation, distribution, and exploitation, 
because none of the new wealth created after 1949 has reached the working people It has 
gone elsewhere. He speculates that some of China’s wealth was squandered in Vietnam 
and Albania, where the regimes cherished the same values as Mao Finally, Wei defines 
democracy as the “means of placing all power in the hands of the working people.” Too 
illustrate his point that working people can manage state power, Wei cites Yugoslavia, 
saying the people there had proved no need for a dictatorship. It was an interesting 
comparison, because he did not fully understand the nature of Yugoslavia in the Eastern 
Bloc nor its strained relationship with the Soviet Union.10
Wei defines the democracy he envisions for China as representative through 
elections where the representatives “manage affairs on the people’s behalf and in 
accordance with the will and interests of the people. This alone can be called democracy .” 
In addition, the people must be able to replace those public office holders as necessary to
l0Ibid.. 205-207.
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avoid abuses of power and oppression o f the people. He said these are rights the that the 
people of Europe, the United States, and Japan enjoy No such rights exist in China, and 
an ill reference to Mao, though he is dead, could bring considerable trouble with the 
authorities. Wei went further to say that to compare the socialist system of “centralized 
democracy” of China with the “exploiting class democracy” of capitalism would show 
clearly how the vast differences in the values and treatment a democracy benefits its 
people. Wei says there is little chance that if the Chinese embraced democracy over the 
current system that the country would slide in to chaos, because China has already been 
thrown into chaos and anarchy by the present system. He was specifically referring to 
actions by the Cultural Revolution Group, the Gang o f Four, and the usurper Lin Biao.
The same type of people who worried democracy would lead to chaos and anarchy were 
the similar type who worried that when the Qing Dynasty collapsed under pressure from 
Westerners chaos would follow. They were willing to suffer oppression rather than 
assume the risks that experiencing democratic freedom might bring. Wei argues that 
democracy “is infinitely better than facing abusive overlords against whom we have no 
means of redress ”11
In speaking to the Chinese people through his wall poster and later as a lead article 
in Explorations in January 1979, Wei was trying to convince the Chinese people that the 
system they were living under had failed to bring the prosperity and progress it had 
promised. He called on them to rally to democracy, saying that the stability and unity o f 
dictators in fascist totalitarianism would only bring disaster to them. Democracy is the 
precondition of all modernization -  social and economic. The reactionaries in history have
"Ibid.. 207-208.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
always fought against the development of democracy because it gives the common people 
-  their natural enemies -  everything and leaves oppressors with no weapons to oppose the 
people. He said the United States is the best example of what happens when democracy 
defeats dictatorship, which brings on the conditions that generate social development. 
However, achieving democracy in China would not come easily or without a substantial 
price, and each tiny success would require a major price. The Chinese people need only 
see the direction and those who oppose democracy will be defeated. Wei said the Cultural 
Revolution showed the power the people possessed, but it came when they lacked clear 
direction and they still had faith in dictators. That aspect of China’s development is past 
and the people have a clear goal. To Wei, the Democracy Wall was the first battlefield.12
As a result of his first wall poster and his immediate notoriety, a small group 
formed to help Wei publish Explorations (Tansno). In the beginning he worked from the 
home of his girlfriend, but later published it from his father’s apartment in a room set aside 
for when Wei married. The informal political journal had press runs between 150 to 1,500 
copies per issue and circulated in Beijing and once in Tianjin. In Beijing during the 
beginning of the Democracy Movement, there were more than fifty-five people’s informal 
political periodicals published, and across China journals were published in most major 
cities by a variety of unofficial study societies and lecturers. The outpouring of the 
movement was not lost on Deng Xiaoping himself. Deng had published a mimeographed 
an unofficial Communist weekly Red Light, while a student in France in the 1920s.13 Li 
Yizhe, a pseudonymous wall poster writing team, was released from prison on I January
'-[bid.. 209-212.
1 Jonathan D. Spence. The Gate o f  Heavenly Peace: The Chinese and Their Revolution 1895- 
1980 (New Yoik: Penguin Books. 1981), 405.
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1979 as part of a demand of the Democracy Movement, which was considered a major 
victory for the movement and an indication of the more liberal views of the new regime.14 
Deng Xiaoping initially welcomed the Democracy Movement because it aided his own 
political agenda in at least three ways. Deng established the popular momentum among 
intellectuals and political democracy activists to oust his rivals for CCP and government 
leadership, strengthened his programs for modernization, and garnered increasingly 
widespread support from the people.15 But the Democracy Movement had begun reaching 
Deng’s limits of tolerance and he began closing the road to speech. For Wei Jingsheng, 
time was running out faster than the life of the Democracy Movement On 25 March 1979 
Wei -  writing in Explorations -  bitterly attacked a speech made by Deng on 16 March 
that essentially indicated the aging leader still believed in the fundamental leadership of 
China by the CCP. Deng said that the Four Cardinal Principles -  the socialist road, the 
people’s democratic dictatorship, the primacy of the CCP, Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong Thought -  would be upheld.16 Wei accused Deng of becoming a new dictator and 
he asked the Chinese people in his Explorations article if they wanted a new dictator or 
democracy. April Fifth Forum challenged Wei’s essay in a wall poster on 28 March 1979, 
saying the normal development of democracy in China had to be accompanied by 
regulations to strengthen the movement and not to stop it. Four days after the article 
appeared, which had been published anonymously, Wei and most of those who helped him 
publish Explorations were arrested. While some people attempted to stop the twenty some
MNathan. Chinese Democracy, 22-23. 31.
15Wei. xii.
1 “George Black and Robin Munro. Black Hands o f Beijing: Lives o f Defiance in China s 
Democracy Xfovement (New York: John Wiley & Sons. Inc.. 1993). 50.
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police officers, Wei was taken away after a scuffle in which he almost escaped. At the 
same time, authorities in other cities began arresting many other democrats, and though 
the actual count is not known it has been estimated that as many as a hundred political 
activists of varying degree were arrested and sentenced to prison. He was held by police in 
the Banbuqiao detention center in Beijing and his arrest was never publicly announced by 
the government, though word of the arrest spread throughout the Democracy Movement. 
Wei was brought to criminal trial 16 October 1979 in the Beijing Municipal People’s 
Procuratorate and charged with leaking highly classified defense information to English 
and French foreign correspondents and publishing counterrevolutionary statements. China 
has since abandoned its counterrevolutionary laws, but at the time of Wei’s arrest the 
policy had only just been enacted. Wei was told by the authorities that every Chinese has 
the freedom of belief, but not the freedom to overthrow the state -  although in all of Wei’s 
writings he never advocated the overthrow of the Chinese government.17
Wei argued at his trial that Article 45 of the Chinese Constitution gave all citizens 
the rights of free speech and a free press. He said his writings were “simply to attempt a 
tentative exploration of the path along which China could achieve prosperity ” He also 
said he was not aware that English and French foreign correspondents were considered 
enemies of the state. When he spoke with them about the Sino-Vietnamese War, which 
had essentially been a long running border dispute that remains still not completely 
resolved today, he was speaking as a concerned citizen and was basing his knowledge on 
published news accounts and not on any secret documents, for which he had no access or
1 Nathan. Chinese Democracy. 34.
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knowledge. Wei denied that he betrayed “the motherland,” supplied the enemy with 
anything, and he gave his friends no secrets -  national or military, “thus the prosecution’s 
accusation that I committed treason is unfounded.” Wei said the charge of being a 
counterrevolutionary is absurd because the essence o f “revolution is the struggle of new 
phenomena against old.” While his essays did attack Marxism as the state had charged 
him, Wei said he was addressing the distorted Marxism o f Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, 
who attempted to gain control o f the nation during the height o f the Cultural Revolution 
and had since been discredited. Wei had made accusations against Deng Xiaoping when he 
advocated democratic reforms for the Chinese government, but he was not specifically 
charged with that by the court. Finally, Wei argued in his defense that “the Constitution 
grants citizens the right to criticize their leaders, because these leaders are human beings 
and not gods. It is only through the people’s criticism and supervision that those leaders 
will make fewer mistakes, and only in this way will avoid the misfortune of having their 
lords and masters ride roughshod over them.”18
He was convicted of providing foreigners with national military information, 
carrying out counterrevolutionary propaganda and agitation, slandering Mandst-Leninist- 
Mao Zedong Thought, and attempting to overthrow the state by calling for democracy 
and human rights in speeches and writings. Wei was sentenced to fifteen years in prison 
and was to be deprived o f all political rights for three years after completion of his 
sentence, and his appeal to the Beijing Municipal People’s Court was rejected. As a matter 
of background, the family retained a young lawyer from Beijing University to represent 
him at trial. She was not given the indictment or told when the trial would be held. The
18Wei. 215-225.
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government did not permit anyone from his family or his lawyer to attend the trial.19
After his trial he was portrayed as a chronic malinger and troublemaker, and as 
someone who had sold secrets to foreigners. Most activists were being portrayed as thugs 
and traitors, and anyone who hung wall posters, mimeographed newspapers, and journals 
were linked to the chaos o f the Cultural Revolution and the Gang o f Four, which was not 
entirely without foundation because many of those who joined in the Democracy 
Movement were involved in the ill-fated struggle punctuated by the Red Guards 
generation or were influenced by those events. Wei’s own experiences in the Red Guards 
is not well known, but it was relatively short-lived. The People's Daily supported the 
government’s conviction o f Wei and accused him of “ultrademocratization.” Wang Juntao 
of Beijing Spring tended to follow Deng’s shift from moderate back to the left and said he 
really had not wanted the democratic politics of capitalism, but wished for a genuine 
proletarian socialist democracy -  which illustrated how the activists were still struggling to 
determine their positions in the movement.20 It became a brutal time for the political 
activists of the Democracy Movement who had placed so much hope and energy into 
changing to nation they most essentially loved.21
Prison, however, did little to thwart Wei Jingsheng’s passion for writing. He was 
not allowed to write anything for the first two years in prison, but after being transferred 
to Beijing Number One Prison he was permitted to resume writing. In his first letter, Wei 
thanked the central government for permitting a visit by his family, but he also took 
advantage of the opportunity by asking the government to be permitted to receive books
19 Ibid.. 257.
20 Black and Munro. 51.
21 Nathan. Chinese Democracy. 40-41.
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and magazines from his family as part of his overall reeducation effort. The tone of most 
of his letters to his family were relatively typical o f family letters, taking about day-to-day 
conditions and his overall health. But some of his letters were also politically 
inflamatory.22 He wrote to Deng Xiaoping in October 1992 about Tibet and the need for 
China to withdraw or at least grant the country greater autonomy. In a letter in June 1991, 
Wei discussed human rights with President Jiang Zemin and Li Peng, urging the 
government and the CCP to find out “how political and administrative organs can be made 
to show more respect, and provide more protection, for human rights.”23
Wei Jingsheng’s arrest and conviction became known around the world and stirred 
up support both within and outside China. In 1989, the activist and scientist Fang Lizhi 
wrote a letter to Deng Xiaoping to request Wei’s release from prison. Many others, more 
than a hundred Chinese intellectuals, also wrote seeking Wei’s release. His first release 
from prison came on 14 September 1993 when China was actively trying to win the 
competition to host the 2000 Olympics and wanted to demonstrate it had improved its 
human rights record. The government issued Wei a parole just nine days before the 
International Olympic Committee was to announce what city would host the 2000 summer 
games. The terms of his parole and original prison sentence forbade him from conducting 
any democracy activities or to exercise any political rights. As soon as he was released 
from prison, he began writing almost immediately, even securing permission to publish 
some essays abroad. Through his writings new attention was paid to the Democracy
-  Wei. 1-5. 259.
■^ Wei Jingsheng. Letter to Jiang Zemin and Li Peng, United Daily [database online] November 
1993. The Democracy Project. Department of Chinese Studies. Stockholm University (Stockholm: 
Stockholm University. 1995-98. cited 14 January 1997): available from 
http://orienl4.orient.su.se/Iettcr.htm: INTERNET.
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Movement in China and elsewhere in the Western world. The 4 June 1989 Tiananmen 
Square demonstrations helped fuel world opinion in favor of the political activists, and the 
Chinese government had inadvertently turned Wei Jingsheng into a world human rights 
cause. He continued to maintain his contacts with other political activists not realizing the 
state security officials were maintaining considerable surveillance. Wei carried on political 
activism, believing he was protected by constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.
Wei met with John Shattuck, U.S. assistant secretary of state for human rights and 
humanitarian affairs, on 27 February 1994. Wei actually argued that the United States 
should extend Most Favored Nation status to China to help the people and improve their 
economic conditions. Chinese authorities were outraged. He was detained by authorities 
on 1 April 1994.24 He was held for nearly a year without outside contact before a five- 
hour trial was held on 13 December 1995 at Beijing’s No. 1 Intermediate Court and was 
sentenced to 14 years in prison for attempting to overthrow the government. Amnesty 
International claimed at the time of the sentencing that Wei was a prisoner of conscience, 
who was being held for the simple free exercise of his right to freedom of expression and 
association. Once again in his own defense Wei cited the Chinese Constitution and the 
express rights to certain freedoms.25
Beginning in 1995 and every year after Wei Jingsheng was nominated for the 
Nobel Peace Prize and was awarded the Olof Palme Award and the European Parliament’s 
Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought in 1996. Wei’s second release from prison came
24 Wei. jo / / .  267.
Amnesty International. China: If'ei Jingsheng Sentence a Mockery o f Justice [database online) 
13 December 1995. cited 3 October 1997; available from 
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under entirely different circumstances, but tinged with the same political flavor of the 
previous released. He was released 16 November 1997 shortly after President Jiang Zemin 
returned from a state visit to the United States, which was his first since taking the 
leadership of China after Deng Xiaoping. The release was apparently directed at overtures 
from President Clinton, who made remarks about China’s human rights record and 
behavior at the White House shortly before Jiang returned from his visit and tour of the 
United States. Other jailed political activists may be released this year in preparation for 
President Clinton’s state visit to China, his first. Wei was technically released for health 
reasons and given a medical parole to travel to the United States, essentially with the 
understanding that he could not return to China, something Wei had previously resisted 
which prolonged his time in prison.
Since his arrival in the United States, Wei has been treated for his medical illnesses 
and gone on tour promoting democracy in China. His first advice for President Clinton is 
to keep pressuring China to improve its human rights record. He also said he has lost hope 
than Jiang Zemin can improve conditions in China “I haven’t seen anything new from him.
I think I am gradually losing hope that he can represent anything new.”26 Wei has also 
spoken with members of the United States Congress early this year and received the 
National Endowment for Democracy’s annual award. But Wei also has not been without 
his critics since his release from prison a second time. Xu Wenli, a prominent activist who 
was imprisoned for 12 years for publishing an underground newspaper, attacked Wei late 
last year for being headstrong, arrogant, and too soft on Deng Xiaoping. It was an odd
2(,.\'ew York Times. "Excerpts From Wei's Remarks" 22 November 1997 [newspaper online| cited 
22 November 1997: available from http://www.nvtimes.com/vT/mo/day/ncvvs/world/china-dissident- 
tcxt.html: INTERNET.
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twist to criticize a fellow activist in a letter that was distributed to news organizations in 
Beijing, but it also points to the continuing practice among the members of the Democracy 
Movement to attack each other in public, a continuing major weakness the movement has 
not learned to control.27
: Seth Faison. "Critic of China Is Assailed by Colleagues." .Veu- York Times 25 November 1997 
[newspaper online] cited 25 November 1997. available from 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE JUNE FOURTH MOVEMENT
For a Westerner, Tiananmen Square is too complex to comprehend because there 
is no place else like it in the world. Geographically, it is a blend of ancient and modem 
China. To the north of the square along Changan Avenue stands the Gate of Heavenly 
Peace, an entrance to the ancient Imperial City -  for centuries the focal point of Chinese 
government and the place where dynastic rule ended in 1911. To the west is the Great 
Hall of the People, the modem focal point of Chinese government, and opposite it across 
the square is the Museum of Chinese History. For several years leading up to the hand 
over of Hong Kong a giant electric clock board stood in front of the museum counting 
down the minutes, literally, until Hong Kong was returned to Chinese control. The 
mausoleum and memorial hall to Chairman Mao Zedong stands at the south end of the 
square.
On the west side of the Imperial City and adjacent is Zhongnanhai, which serves as 
the official headquarters and the residences for leaders of the Chinese government -  an 
interesting juxtaposition of power relationships. In the center of the square is a relatively 
ornate obelisk to the People’s Heroes, and near the north end of the square just across 
Changan Avenue from the Imperial City is a white flag pole that bears the national flag of 
the People’s Republic of China, guarded by two members of the Beijing Garrison of the 
PLA. If you arrive at sunrise, you can watch the brief ceremony as the flag is raised each 
day in seeming harmony with the universe.
Tiananmen Square is a mystical place that stands figuratively at the center of the 
Middle Kingdom (Zhong Guo), but it is, also, a place that is politically in the center of the
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Middle Kingdom. Tiananmen actually means in Chinese “Gate of Heavenly Peace,” which 
is ironic because it was designed by Yongie, one of China’s most brutal Ming Dynasty 
emperors. He built it to demonstrate power, but to also plead with heaven to grant him 
eternal and stable rule 1 Quite noticeable is the huge portrait of Chairman Mao on the 
entrance to the Imperial City with two large placards on either side that read, “Long Live 
the Unity of the Peoples of the World,” and “Long Live the People’s Republic of China.”
Tiananmen Square, or the site o f the current square, has been used for a number of 
major political protests or events for more than a century, including student protests in 
1898 when students were preparing to take their third and final national examinations The 
students protested the extreme terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 that followed 
China’s disastrous defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 That demonstration 
startled the Chinese government because it not been the custom of anyone to address a 
petition directly to the Imperial government unless the road had been widened for 
comment on state matters. Even more impressive, the students gave their petition directly 
to the Imperial Censorate, equally unheard of in Chinese government.
Though in more recent times, and related to the events that led to 4 June 1989, 
was the May Fourth Movement o f 1919. Chinese students protested the Nationalist 
government’s agreement to cede Germany’s territorial concessions in China, which dated 
to the Qing Dynasty, to Japan at the Versailles peace conference in France. The 
government of the First Republic tried to suppress the protests, but only succeeded in 
enlarging them. The actual demonstration on 4 May 1919 lasted all o f one afternoon, but
1 Liu Binyan. Ruan Ming, and Xu Gang, “ Tell the World: " What Happened in China and Why 
trans. Henry L. Epstein (New York: Pantheon Books. 1989). 68.
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it spawned a nationwide movement, and it made Tiananmen the center of political protest 
and political storm. On 10 June 1925, another major rally was held at Tiananmen Square 
over an incident in which the British police killed thirteen people in an anti-imperialist 
demonstration in Shanghai. The rally in Beijing drew more than 100,000 protesters.2
The December Ninth Movement in 1935 was a mass protest begun when 
thousands of students protested President Chiang Kai-shek’s refusal to create a united 
front using elements of the Nationalist Army and the guerrilla forces o f then CCP leader 
Mao Zedong to oppose the Japanese military advances in Northeast China. Nationalist 
military commanders in Beijing, because the Nationalist government was in Nanjing, 
turned fire hoses on the protesting students, which proved highly effective in the freezing 
December weather of Beijing.3
Mao Zedong climbed atop Tiananmen 1 October 1949 to proclaim to the world, 
but especially to the Chinese people, that the Second Republic marked the end of foreign 
encroachment and the establishment of a Communist Republic. It was an important 
moment, regardless of his communist ideology, because he rejected Western involvement 
in China something that had not been possible during the ill-fated Qing Dynasty and 
Nationalist Republic. However, the denouement of the communist revolution came on 5 
April 1976 when Chinese students marked the death of Premier Zhou Enlai. They chose to 
mark his death and the meaning of his life to China on the annual day o f the Qing Ming 
festival, which is when the living offer their respects to the dead in what is also called the 
sweeping of the graves. The demonstration began out of respect but became a protest
: Orville Schell. The Mandate o f  Heaven (New York: Touchstone. 1995). 22-23.
3 Ibid. 23-24.
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against the Gang of Four, Lin Biao, and the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, while 
praising the life of Zhou. Finally, on 1 January 1987 protesting students stormed past 
police blockades to reach Tiananmen Square to make demands against the slow pace that 
democratization was taking.4
The 1986-87 demonstrations influenced the 4 June 1989 showdown between the 
students and the government over lagging democratization. Beginning in 1986 attempts at 
further political reforms were proposed by Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, but party elders 
once again drew concerned with the direction they were taking. Discussions proposed 
making the National People’s Congress a working legislature and instituting laws to 
guarantee legitimate freedom of speech. Additionally, intellectuals such as Fang Lizhi 
began telling students that individual rights are not handed down from the party-state, but 
are inherent. He urged students to strive for their rights, and students began attempting to 
gain public office in local elections. Local officials blocked them and by late 1986 a set of 
protests had begun.
Protests spread among universities and by January 1987 had reached Beijing. Deng 
ordered Hu Yaobang to halt the demonstrations, but Hu was reluctant because he 
supported the proposed reforms. A brief period of repression followed, Hu was purged as 
CCP General Secretary, and the entire episode ended by April 1987 Fang Lizhi, and the 
writers Liu Binyan and Wang Ruowang were targeted largely because they could attract 
large audiences.5
4 Ibid.. 24-29.
5 Goldman. "Politically-Engaged Intellectuals in the Deng-Jiang Era: A Changing Relationship 
with the Pam-State." 40-41.
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Two factors began to influence Deng Xiaoping and the party-state aparatus: fear 
of losing vital foreign investment and the increasing relationship between Chinese 
intellectuals and outside intellectuals, who often generated unfavorable public pressure 
China under Deng had begun to care about its international image and position -  no longer 
clinging to the notion that as the Middle Kingdom nothing from the outside world 
mattered. By 1988, the Deng regime and its intellectual coalition had separated, as Deng 
still attempted to hold together a Leninist political system. As in the case of the late Qing 
Dynasty, the Dowager Empress Cixi was willing to entertain some political reforms -  too 
late to be useful, to be sure -  but it was more a question of leadership than reform. That 
was where Deng found himself in 1988 The intellectuals continued to argue that political 
liberalization had to accompany economic reforms if the country was to avoid social 
conflicts.6
Zhao Ziyang succeeded Hu Yaobang as general secretary of the party in late 1987 
One of his primary roles was to protect the intellectuals and reunite them with the regime, 
a task at which he failed. Many believed that Zhao was less interested in political reforms 
and more interested in his own political agenda. Few of Hu’s intellectual network rejoined 
the regime because Zhao had undermined Hu’s influence and because Zhao was 
supporting a new authoritarian view. A view was developed that for China to establish 
democratic reforms, the country would require several decades of rapid economic reforms 
-  Deng’s plans had only been in force since 1978, less than a decade Additionally to 
support these economic reforms, China would have to develop a substantial middle class -
6 Ibid. 41-42.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6 6
a pattern of the “four little dragons.” Deng supported this view because it rationalized his 
own agenda.7 He had said that the modernization process in a country still backward 
called for strongman politics with authority and not a Westem-style democracy He 
endorsed a type of neo-authoritarianism considered necessary for Chinese government as a 
transitional stage between China’s much older traditional society and modem society8
Liberals supporting political reforms had argued that reforms were vitally needed 
to lessen social tensions caused by rapid economic developments, creating a potentially 
explosive social situation. Hu had determined earlier in the 1980s that Chinese stability in 
the changing environment depended on free elections of leaders following democratic 
procedures. He wrote in the Economic Weekly 5 Mary 1989 that “democratic elections 
may not necessarily choose leaders o f the best quality, but they ensure that bad leaders will 
not be able to remain in power ” He also disputed the party’s concept o f majority rule 
socialist democracy, saying that the minority who holds different opinions require 
protection as well. The intellectuals that responded to this reasoning did so for two critical 
reasons -  their own repression and disillusionment, and an increasing understanding of 
democracy 9
Hu Yaobang, recovering in the hospital from a heart attack, died suddenly on 15 
April 1989. His death touched off six weeks o f protest led by students from mid-April to 4 
June 1989 It has been variously described, but the Chinese government refers to it as 
simply “turmoil.” Students immediately seized the moment as an opportunity to show
‘ Ib id . 42.
8 Michael Oksenberg. Lawrence R. Sullivan, and Marc Lambert, eds.. Beijing Spring, 1989: 
Confrontation and Conflict, The Basic Documents (Armonk. N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. Inc.. 1990). 125-126.
'’Goldman. "Politically-Engaged Intellectuals in the Deng-Jiang Era." 43.
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respect for his death -  a man regarded as a reformer who was persecuted for it Wall 
posters were put up on walls around campuses almost as soon as it became known of his 
death. In two days time marchers had giant photographs of Hu to carry, which clearly 
indicates the students were organized. Demonstrations were already developed to coincide 
with the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement. Hu’s death provided a 
chance to move the date up and the student demonstrators did. Photographs were 
provided by old reformers and business people who supported the reform movement, but 
who did not desire to join the demonstrations. The communications among these student 
groups and reformers was a tightly controlled network, though the student demonstrators 
were not organized into any type o f formal organization. The majority of the students 
were not manipulated by a few leaders and there were no outside agitators constituting a 
“black hand” behind the protests, as had been suggested by the government in the 
aftermath. The student demonstrations had a loose leadership that was diffuse, often 
contested, and planning was informal and rooted more in custom than in any kind of 
design. The movement, too, had deep roots in Chinese traditions, including old slogans, 
protest themes, and national concerns. These proved helpful in opening the 
demonstrations to a large number o f workers, government officials, and ordinary people -  
the “old hundred names,” or laobctixing 10
The June Fourth protests, though joined by some others in the greater community, 
were begun by urban intellectuals -  not the same mixture of peasants that had supported 
Mao and his guerrilla revolution that toppled the Nationalist Republic in 1949.
10 Craig Calhoun, Seither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in 
China (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1994). 1-2.
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Nevertheless, the students acted out the reform movement in 1989 indirectly aided by the 
government that had expressed a desire to see reforms -  so in a greater context the 
students were acting in accordance with the aims of the party-state apparatus. Equally 
important in understanding this movement is the style of remonstrance demonstrated by 
the university students. They presented petitions and banners, attempted to resolve issues 
within the existing party-state structure, and demanded a dialogue with the governmental 
authorities, who for the most part were extremely reticent to interact with the protesters 
lest they be seen as condoning the movement. This was clearly a classical confrontation 
between intellectuals and the government. That it was any different from the protests of 
1898 and the various periods thereafter are problematic, but part of a continuous tradition 
all the same.11
Unfortunately, because the movement never became unified -  an attribute of the 
entire Democracy Movement -  it prevented and stalled attempts to withdraw from 
Tiananmen Square in sufficient time to avoid the eventual showdown with the PLA, but it 
also created disorder, disputes, and petty abuses of power. The movement essentially 
outgrew its organizational capacity
Nineteen Eighty Nine was to be a year of intense political celebrations and 
commemorations even without the student demonstrations of the June Fourth Movement.
It was the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the 
thirtieth anniversary of the Lushan Conference, and the twentieth anniversary of the death 
of Liu Shaoqi. Added to that was the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth
11 Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom and Elizabeth J. Peny. eds.. Popular Protest and Political Culture in 
Modem China (Boulder. Colo.: Westvicw Press. 1992). 148-160.
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Movement, and the tenth anniversary of the Democracy Wall Movement, which began one 
block away from Tiananmen Square. It was a time of intense political feelings, which was 
most apparent among intellectuals and the university students. These students had 
benefited indirectly because of the Cultural Revolution. They were freer to attend college 
than before, though they still had to take national examinations to gain entrance, and they 
came with less political education than for students before the Cultural Revolution. This 
left them with the ability to absorb more that was foreign and Western.12
The average age of China’s leadership by 1989 was regarded as a failure of 
China’s attempts at modernization. The role of China’s elders was often characterized by 
democracy activists as a drag on progress and a source of embarrassment -  a sign of 
backwardness. Many Chinese activists believed or hoped at least, that China’s communist 
regime would become a short-lived dynasty, following dynastic pattern. Dynastic patterns 
usually followed a natural course: strong and sometimes expanding in their youth, stable 
and peaceful in middle age, and increasingly prone to crises and instability as they grew 
old. Students who participated in the June Fourth Movement decried Deng Xiaoping’s 
extraordinary hold on power, often equating him with the Dowager Empress Cixi. A 
student described the student-led democracy movement of that spring as a “life-or-death 
struggle between democracy and totalitarianism. We want to overthrow Deng Xiaoping 
because we see him as the last dictator in the centuries-long history of China.” Few 
students thought that short-term reforms would end the People’s Republic. What they did 
see was a weakening with the succession crisis and believed reforms were possible. Of
I: Calhoun. 3.
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course, the June Fourth protests actually heightened the succession of Deng and ultimately 
caused Jian Zemin to rise to power. His own performance as Mayor of Shanghai during 
the June Fourth events were interesting and far more stabilizing and peaceful than the 
Beijing response 13
The college campuses had become places of intense political activism, as 
demonstrations and protests were already being discussed openly The students saw 
themselves as critical agents o f protest and struggle in Chinese society emanating from the 
May Fourth Movement tradition. The pattern of protest adopted for the 1989 march on 
Tiananmen for Hu Yaobang followed the pattern established by the 5 April 1976 
demonstrations for Zhou Enlai. As many as five to ten thousand people initially marched 
to Tiananmen Square, about eight miles from the Beijing University campus, on 18 April 
1989 to rally in front of the Great Hall of the People. The protesters largely came from 
Beijing’s most elite universities.14
The students sought democracy, but within a very wide range of meanings. They 
wanted a degree of autonomy and recognition, a degree o f civil rights that would 
guarantee a richer public life and provide some realm o f privacy, and they sought an end 
to corruption in government and that essentially included party interference in 
governmental operations. They also sought a richer China and a better share of those 
riches. Western observers have had difficulty understanding the desire for democracy 
because they do not understand what kind of democracy the Chinese activists seek. 
Originally the students were seeking a limited agenda that included state recognition of an
13 Ibid.. 8.
14 Ibid.. 31-37.
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autonomous students’ association, improvement of a variety of conditions at universities, 
and more choice in merit selection in the assignment of jobs to graduates. After the protest 
began and widened, issues grew deeper and ionger-range ideas came with them. The 
students approached the demonstrations from two perspectives -  they were becoming 
intellectuals and saw China’s problems from the roles they would play, and they also 
genuinely were concerned with the country’s future. It was true that they saw 
governmental policies hurting their own changes for privileges and income, but they also 
saw from a broader perspective that the policies were preventing them from doing 
something to meet the country’s challenges.15 For the many people who experienced the 
Cultural Revolution, the similarities between the students that formed the Red Guards and 
the students that led the June Fourth Movement were too close. That played a role in the 
somewhat dampened support the students of 1989 received when the government turned 
on them and the violence erupted. Nevertheless, the role of the June Fourth Movement in 
the context of the greater Democracy Movement is critical, because it reflects how far the 
movement had come from those days of wall posters twenty years earlier. The students 
were continuing the tradition of remonstrance established centuries ago.
Democracy, to work and function as a viable political system, requires a 
participatory discourse and the students believed their role was essential in several ways. 
First, they viewed themselves as watchdogs of government and accountability, second as 
proposers o f policy, and finally as interpreters for the demands and needs of the people. 
Technological improvements and economic reforms were needed, to be sure, but they
15 Ibid.. 240-241.
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could not be accomplished without intellectuals.16
One of the continuing problems relatively evident as the June Fourth Movement 
progressed to its violent end was that the Western press covering the event did not fully 
appreciate what it was that the students wanted when they called for democratic reforms. 
One student described his concept as “more in terms of Rousseau and the model of direct 
participation.” His understanding comes from the fundamental concept of the Western 
Social Contract Theory of which Rousseau is widely regarded as the most articulate 
writer Nevertheless, Chinese understanding o f democracy varied widely 17 The manifestos 
and petitions repeatedly called for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
However, some have argued that while the student protests were passionate, they were 
too vague and weak on innovative ideas, especially about how to move China from neo­
authoritarianism into a democratic system. What the student protesters appeared to lack 
was a clear concept of the democracy for China and the specific reforms necessary to get 
there. Student leaders, however, argued quite well that the broad themes had greater mass 
appeal and the narrower issues that contained more detail would have to be discussed with 
the government. This is a very important, and a very traditional, perspective. It had been 
considered in ancient China a significant attribute of any political leader who could reduce 
complex issues to relatively simple and eloquent statements -  something Mao did with 
considerable regularity. Most of the students undoubtedly held only a passing knowledge 
of the American, European, and Japanese modem political systems. Most did not 
understand how any o f these systems operated in a functional sense. This in part accounts
16 Ibid.. 241.
r  Ibid. 244.
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for the lack of specific institutional changes and reforms in their writings or speeches 
What the posters did specifically state were fundamental and basic demands. They wanted 
“the right o f people to have a say in their government’s policies; the right o f individuals to 
choose their own values, careers, and places o f residence; the subjugation o f personal 
power to the rule of law; and freedom of speech, assembly, and the press.” Some students, 
no doubt carried away by early successes in the protests, even started calling for a 
multiparty system. A student from Beijing Normal University defined in a big character 
poster 2 May 1989 his perspective of democracy in China. He said that government “is 
only an administrator of the people’s sovereign will, an institution to which the people 
grant administrative power and entrust law enforcement power. If the National People’s 
Congress is truly to reflect the people’s will, the electoral procedures for its 
representatives must be changed.”18
The events leading up the 3-4 June 1989 crackdown in which hundreds, if not 
thousands, or more died have been well reported throughout the world and were watched 
by millions on television. There has to date been no accurate accounting o f the number of 
people killed or injured as a result of the violent crackdown. Officially, the Chinese 
government has said that no one was killed in Tiananmen Square -  which is a purely 
technical point because most who died were outside the square at the time they were 
killed, though there were injuries sustained actually in the square. The important thing to 
come from the June Fourth Movement, though, is that a whole new generation of 
intellectuals and students carried on what had begun late in 1978 with the first big
18 Han Minzhu and Hua Sheng. eds.. Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 
Chinese Democracy Movement (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1990). 137-145.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7 4
character posters to appear on Beijing’s Democracy Wall. The movement did not end, but 
has continued with the next generation. President Jiang Zemin said during a visit to 
Canada in December 1997 that the crackdown was essential to China’s stability. He said 
that during the 1989 political arrests “had the then-Chinese Government failed to adopt 
resolute measures, then we could not have enjoyed today’s stability ”19 Wang Dan, a key 
activist who led the June Fourth protests, said in New York on 24 April 1998 that had he 
known in advance “that so many people would have died, I would have done things 
differently ” Wang, now 29, was released from prison in China and allowed to come to the 
United States on medical parole. He was sentenced in 1996 to eleven years on charges of 
conspiracy to subvert the state, though he had actually been jailed from 1989 to 1993. His 
concern of the outcome of the protests lies to some degree with his own feelings of guilt 
He said that when so many were killed “I have the feeling of moral guilt in this matter and 
I imagine I will have this all my life. At the time we were young and naive in certain ways 
and therefore made mistakes that led to this tragedy.” Wang continues to promote 
democracy for China.20
Liu Binyan, a former reporter for the People's Daily, speculates that the reason 
the June Fourth Movement was not entirely successful in transforming ideology into 
action was that reformers within the CCP and government were indecisive. Reformers did 
not conduct dialogues with the students, then-Premier Li Peng and his government, and
19 Agence France Presse. "Crackdown led to today's stability'." South China Morning Post. 3 
December 1997 [newspaper on-linej. cited 3 December 1997; available from 
http://www.scmp.com/news/template/templat... na&template=Default.htx&maxfieldsize= 1457.html; 
INTERNET.
20 Edward A. Gargan. “Dissident Says Students Bore Some Blame in Tiananmen." .Yew York 
Times. 24 April 1998 [newspaper online] cited 24 April 1998; available from 
http://www.mtimes.com/yT/mo/day/news/worId/china-dissident.html; INTERNET.
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they did not pursue alternatives through the legal process. Liu also said that reformers 
failed to utilize the mass media to either strengthen the case made by the student protests 
or to gain broader public support for changes.21
:iLiu Binyan. 104-107
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
In East Asia there is a strong tradition of intellectual criticism of unrestrained 
power, but there is no heritage of institutional limitations on power. Remonstrance, the 
ancient system of political criticism, has been a part of Chinese political life since before 
the time of Qin Shi Huang Di and the unification of China under one emperor 
Remonstrance differs from dissidence in that the activist who practices remonstrance is not 
attempting to break the political system down from without in the context of revolution, 
but is attempting to bring about constructive change from within through reform. Though 
China moved from an imperial political system in 1911 through two Republican periods, it 
still possesses traditional patterns that have stymied reform and liberalization. Among the 
patterns are the continuing importance of guatig xi -  which reflects continued political 
culture -  and persisting patterns of patriarchal authoritarianism. Even now past totalitarian 
excess is explained as feudal despotism. The Leninism often employed by Mao could 
provide a useful cover for more blatant traditional authoritarianism. Nevertheless, reform 
has come from official sources, and the culture of reform has come from the democratic 
opposition over the last twenty years.1
With the arrest of the Gang of Four less than a month after the death of Mao, 
immediate changes in Chinese politics were introduced. A minor, but clearly real 
liberalization ensued in both culture and ideology as the country began its push toward 
economic modernization. Deng employed economic rationality over politics to command
1 Peter R. Moody. Jr.. Political Opposition in Post-Confucian Society (New York: Praeger.
1988). 12. 175.
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the country -  parting with the practice of central planning in favor o f a market-driven 
economy. Among Deng’s initiatives was to separate the functions of the party and the 
state, which was designed to eliminate uncontrolled, arbitrary, and personalized power 
These moves did not come smoothly. Under Deng’s system -  the party set ideology, set 
basic policy, and then observed its implementation, while the governmental apparatus 
provided direct rule acting according to law and administrative regulations, representing a 
break from the regime established by Mao who wanted the party involved in every aspect 
of Chinese life. Deng also established special economic zones and autonomous regions and 
provinces ostensibly as part of his economic modernization programs, but in so doing 
initiated an embryonic federal-state system -  in a Western sense -  within the current 
political environment, something he may not have intended but exists. Nevertheless, 
absolute personal political power has remained China’s hindrance since Qin Shi Huang Di. 
Any political activism from the masses has been equated with the dictatorship of the 
Cultural Revolution -  which is not entirely without a basis in fact. The push for political 
liberalization, or democracy, came from Red Guards, more precisely the educated of the 
Cultural Revolution. These youth essentially turned Maoist critique of bureaucratic power 
against the Maoists They had learned that to have democracy also required having power 
that had to be limited and regulated by law. The Cultural Revolution has given political 
activists a common bond that has helped them create a context o f personalized groups 
familiar to post-Confucian political opposition. The most serious weakness faced by 
political activists from the beginning of the modem movement in 1978 has been the failure 
to act in unison and sharing common positions. These necessary political coalitions are
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essential to promote political power.2
For Westerners, the last two decades of changes in Chinese politics have gone 
lacking -  democracy has not been embraced quickly enough and political reforms seem as 
far away as they did when Mao was living. The changes, however, in Chinese political 
realities have been profound. Westerners understand democratization in only one set of 
terms. At the heart of this concept is the notion that holding free and open elections is the 
centerpiece o f a democratic society. Essentially, they see democracy in current terms, not 
understanding what it took to arrive at free and open elections -  they have no substantial 
comprehension of the intellectual history and development o f a modem democratic 
political system, not to mention the price people had to pay for those ideas. 
Democratization is made all the more difficult in nations like China because they have 
never possessed the rudimentary elements of democratic government Political reform,
East or West, requires establishment o f norms governing elite politics, restructuring of 
basic institutions governing relations among parts of the state, as in a division of power 
among the government’s branches; and strengthening of the institutions of political 
participation. Taken in sequence, a country is more likely to survive reform with less 
instability. Deng Xiaoping was faced with two major problems in 1978 -  economic reform 
and political reconstruction. Mao had left him with a political system that was 
dysfunctional. He reestablished norms and began restructuring state institutions. The 
impact of these actions created an acceleration of the next generation into government 
power circles and prevented the perpetuation of individual power bases. The effect was 
dramatic. Deng replaced aging, poorly educated revolutionaries with educated, middle-
: Ibid. 184-192.
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aged officials. Until 1982, the average age of ministers and vice ministers in government 
was 64, and only 37 percent were college educated. After Deng’s institution of reforms, 
the age of ministers and vice ministers dropped to 58, and 52 percent of the government 
leadership was college-educated. With these changes has come an elite that no longer 
engages in bitter ideological debate, and it has become more difficult for extremes to 
dominate the CCP delegates to the NPC or Central Committee. By controlling the 
extremes and by creating an environment for a better educated elite, Deng was able to 
establish a stable transition in power. This enabled the post-Deng elite to compromise on 
policy and personnel matters and enabled Jiang Zemin to enjoy a smoother transition. In 
the post-Mao period China faces two radical transitions. China, in the first instance, needs 
to move to a less centralized political system, and secondly, move from a command 
economy to a market economy. It demands of the Chinese a redefinition of power, 
because both transitions have to happen to prevent a stalemate and possible collapse.3
The price China is paying is extremely high. There has been "massive 
socioeconomic dislocation, rapid shifts in values and beliefs, and mounting pressures on 
the political system.” These problems would simply overwhelm mature political systems. 
China has chosen to muddle along with its existing system and attempted to promote 
political order. Even though Beijing still clings to CCP supremacy, it has begun 
institutional reforms that may change China in dramatic ways. These changes have 
involved the National People’s Congress, which is moving to greater independence, and 
legal reforms that are aimed at preventing the governmental excesses of the Cultural
3 Pei Minxin. "Is China Democratizing?.” Foreign Affairs 77. no. 1 (January/February 1998): 68-
73.
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Revolution. Between 1978 and 1994, the NPC passed 175 laws, while local people’s 
congresses enacted some 3,000 laws. Most modem Chinese laws are developed from 
Western legal doctrines. Increasingly, the people and businesses are turning to the courts 
for legal remedies. The problem of democratic participation is China’s ultimate challenge -  
a restructuring of relations between state and society Even though the institutional 
changes have lagged, a new social contract is developing. Nevertheless, the Chinese 
leadership continues to resist Western notions of democratic reform and popular 
participation.4
In all of this, the modem Democracy Movement that began in 1978 and celebrates 
its twentieth anniversary this year has itself remained quite moderate throughout, which is 
striking in its character. The mainstream democratic movement has always wanted and 
sought changes within the political system, just as Qu Yuan in ancient times sought 
changes, not a revolution. Chinese democrats have consistently behaved as remonstrators 
and not as opponents, though the June Fourth Movement almost became a revolution. The 
Chinese democrats have not sought outright revolution, but have consistently sought 
reforms within the existing system. This is strikingly important -  the activists accept the 
system in which they live, but seek reforms in the defined context not replacement. This 
condition did not change with the June Fourth Movement in 1989 or after -  they still seek 
nonviolent change within the system.
There are a number of reasons for this seeming contradiction. First, the Chinese 
democrats believe change can come from within, and within the Chinese context they have 
continued to believe in socialist democracy. This first factor is the most important. All of
4 Ibid.. 74-79.
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China’s modern constitutions have affirmed popular sovereignty, and even if somewhat 
rhetorical in character they point to the desire that China can become democratic. The 
Chinese democrats have maintained a moderate approach because the regime still 
controlled the police and military Finally, the Democracy Movement has been largely 
composed of students and intellectuals, who are a small minority in Chinese society. They 
had neither the numbers or power to confront the regime in a head-to-head confrontation. 
It has thus been a self-limiting revolution. Most of the early Democracy Movement 
participants in 1978 believed that Deng was moving to democratization, but Wei 
Jingsheng saw Deng more as a new dictator but not as a reformer, and that much of 
Deng’s tolerance of the Democracy Movement was simply temporary as long as it met his 
political agenda. Many intellectuals believed that the confrontation between Deng and Wei 
was regrettable, but also inevitable. The road could be widened to comment only so far 
and Wei had gone too far. Deng saw tactical advantages in shifting from total 
authoritarianism toward a more reform minded state, but not to an extreme.5
Finally, the students of the June Fourth Movement, as well as most of the activists 
in 1978, maintain their long-standing loyalty to the regime because of their own ideals.
The opposition’s vision of democracy is not incompatible with the socialist order. In 1978- 
79 they called for modest political openness and competition from within the system, and 
not from a whole new political order. Wei wanted the Chinese government to adhere to 
the existing constitution with its defined civil liberties, which he believed would 
approximate the democracy of his vision for China. In the 1986-87 debates many of the
5 Andrew J. Nathan. "Chinese Democracy in 1989: Continuity and Change." Problems o f 
Communism 38. no. 5 (September/October 1989) [database on-line) cited 15 January 1997. available from 
http://www. nmis. org/Gatc/themcs/Nathan. html: INTERNET.
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reforms Deng eventually promoted began with debates from the intellectuals and students 
who sought wider roles for the NPC, a civil service system, and separating the party from 
the government The June Fourth Movement sought to petition reforms from the existing 
government. The vision of the reformist democrats was a Chinese system that still 
employed the CCP, but it would be part of a checks and balance system involving 
competitive elections and a free press to keep the government honest and the people 
informed. It called for greater political participation from the people within China’s 
existing constitutional framework. Wei Jingsheng asked for very little more. In the final 
analysis, ten years after Wei had been imprisoned many of the intellectuals had moved in 
the direction of Wei’s original big poster demands in 1978 -  popular participation and 
guaranteed constitutional freedoms.6 Democratic activists are seeking the system first 
perceived by Wei in his path finding essays -  effectively embracing the man who was 
willing to stand alone.
*Ibid.
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